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ABSTRACT
Can there be democracy in America at work? The historical division
between democracy in politics and hierarchy in the economy is under
strain. Hierarchical interests in the economy are shifting their model of
power into politics, and yet a commitment to revive the law is resurgent.
Central examples are the proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, Reward
Work Act, Workplace Democracy Acts, and Employees’ Pension Security
Acts. They would create a right for employees to elect 40% of directors on
$1 billion company boards, a right for employees to elect one-third of
directors on other listed company boards and require one-half employee
representation on single-employer pension plans. All challenge long held
myths: that labor’s involvement in corporate governance is foreign to
American tradition, that when codified in law, labor voice is economically
inefficient; that the legitimate way to have voice in the economy is by
buying stocks; or that labor voice faces insurmountable legal obstacles.
This Article shows these myths are mistaken, by exploring the history and
evidence from 1861. The United States has one of the world’s strongest
traditions of democracy at work. Economic democracy has not been more
widespread primarily because it was suppressed by law. Americans favor
voice at work, while asset managers who monopolize shareholder votes
with “other people’s money” enjoy no legitimacy at all. This Article
concludes that, even without the federal government, and by recreating
themselves as laboratories of democracy and enterprise, states can adapt
the current proposals and rebuild a living law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1921 the author of America’s modern economic constitution,
Adolf A. Berle, wrote that “labor could control,” and this “dream” could
be realized if workers and unions controlled their enterprises, by having
stock “tied to the job.”1 Over his career Berle changed his mind.2 He
advocated tax to encourage diversified investments (not concentrated risk)
in a “wider distribution of stocks” through pensions or mutual funds (not
tied to the job). When everyone had a stake in the future, stockholding
enabled “rationalized wealth distribution . . . serving the American ideal
of a just civilization.” With labor rights to limit the “power of corporate
managements with respect to wages and labor relations,”3 democracy in
the economy would follow the “corporate revolution,” just as democracy
in politics followed the industrial revolution.4 In the Great Society’s
twilight, the goal of modern corporate law was to work in the interests of
the ultimate investor, as labor law’s goal was the interests of the worker.
In the end, they were the same: the people of a democracy in America at
work.5
Today, as economic crisis has lurched toward political rupture,
commitment to the kind of economic constitution that Berle once dreamt
of is resurgent. Four proposed laws provide central examples. First, the
Accountable Capitalism Act of 2018 would require that 40% of boards in
$1 billion companies be elected by employees.6 Second, the Reward Work
Act of 2018 would ensure one-third of listed company board seats are

1. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., How Labor Could Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 7, 1921, at 37, 38.
2. Cf. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 52–55 (1959) (warning against asset
managers using other people’s money emerging as “a permanently concentrated group of officials
building a paramount and virtually unchallenged power position over the American industrial
economy.”); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 39 (1928)
(suggesting that if “trust companies were in the habit of accepting, on ‘custodian account,’ deposits of
stocks from small shareholders, thereby gathering many small holdings into an institution
commanding a block so large that protection was worthwhile, and that they also provided themselves
with power to represent the depositors of stock. Such institutions could easily keep themselves
informed as to the affairs of the corporation . . . and, as representing their clients, could take the action
necessary to prevent or rectify violations of property rights.”).
3. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1965).
4. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 67 (Macmillan 1933) (1932) (“With the corporate revolution, this quality has been lost to
the property owner much as it has been lost to the worker through the industrial revolution.”).
5. Cf. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California (Sept. 23, 1932) (“Democracy . . . is a quest, a
never–ending seeking for better things.”).
6. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018). This would also require federal
charters for $1 billion companies (not a necessity for the operation of other provisions) and require
political donations to have approval of 75% of the board and shareholders.
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elected by employees.7 These are unprecedented proposals in federal law:
the United States would join the majority of countries in the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with laws for voice
at work.8 Third, the Workplace Democracy Acts, whose provisions have
been reintroduced in Congress in varying forms, including the Employees’
Pension Security Act of 2009,9 would require one-half representation of
employees on the boards of every single-employer pension plan.10 Fourth,
the latest version of the Workplace Democracy Act of 2018 would also
restore the capacity for sectoral collective bargaining, ban discrimination
against union members, and prevent employers from misrepresenting their
staff as independent contractors to avoid tax and labor rights.11
These proposals to revive corporate governance meet direct
challenges: historical, economic, political, and legal. First, a story has been
told, notably by labor law scholar Clyde Summers, that votes at work are
foreign and the United States had “no experience with employee
representation on corporate boards.”12 Second, it is assumed that laws to
protect workers’ votes in the economy damage efficiency because,
according to business scholars Michael Jensen and Bill Meckling, such
laws are “less efficient than the alternatives which grow up and survive in
a competitive environment.”13 Third, it has been argued as a matter of
political principle, by figures like Louis Kelso, that the only legitimate way

7. Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018); H.R. 6096, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2)
(2018).
8. The majority of OECD countries (currently 19 out of 36) have some form of law requiring
worker representation on company boards. See the map in Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in
Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the ‘Single Channel,’ 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 81 (2018). The
United Kingdom’s Conservative government reformed most recently, requiring from January 2019
that listed companies comply or explain with employee involvement, including having at least one
worker representative on boards. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, U.K. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 5
(July 2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/WF8L-U68T].
9. Employees’ Pension Security Act of 2009, H.R. 4281, 111th Cong. (2009); see also
Employees’ Pension Security Act of 2008, H.R. 5754, 110th Cong. (2008); Employees’ Pension
Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4055, 109th Cong. (2005).
10. Workplace Democracy Act of 1999, H.R. 1277, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Workplace
Democracy Act of 1997, H.R. 2012, 105th Cong. (1997); Workplace Democracy Act of 1995, H.R.
1355, 104th Cong. (1995); Workplace Democracy Act of 1992, H.R. 5126, 103d Cong. (1994);
Workplace Democracy Act of 1992, H.R. 6041, 102d Cong. (1992).
11. Workplace Democracy Act, H.R. 5728, 115th Cong. (2018); Workplace Democracy Act, S.
2142, 114th Cong. (2015) (reintroduced 2018).
12. Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and
Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. SEC. REG. 155, 155 (1982) (“The United States has had no experience
with employee representation on corporate boards, apart from the small number of employee-owned
enterprises.”).
13. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473 (1979).
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to have voice in corporate governance is by buying stocks.14 And fourth,
the case has frequently been made that, even if legislators wanted, legal
obstacles from federal preemption to antitrust make a more democratic
economy unlawful.15 The purpose of this Article is to show that these
challenges—and all challenges like them—are misplaced: democratic
voice in the economy is embedded in American tradition; efficient,
legitimate (and even without federal) law reform could be written into
states today.
Part I uncovers the remarkable history of democracy in America at
work: in corporate board rooms, pension governance, and work councils,
which the labor movement drove. It concentrates on four historical
periods, from 1861 to 1916, to 1946, to 1980, and to today. As a matter of
history, far from there being “no experience” with workers on boards,
since 1919 the United States has had (however forgotten) the world’s
oldest law continually in force for worker participation in corporate
governance.16 Against all obstacles, unions have had unparalleled success
in getting collective agreements that put workers in boardrooms. The
United States has one of the world’s most sophisticated systems of pension
board governance.17 As a matter of economics, the concentration of voting
power in the hands of the asset managers who control votes on shares, far
from growing up “in a competitive environment,” has only been possible
by law suppressing collective bargaining and the voice in labor’s capital.
The law exacerbates labor’s inherent inequality of bargaining power,
which starts with inequality in the distribution of property.18 Corporate
14. E.g., LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 153, 167 (1958).
(“government should surround the economic status of the capitalist as stockholder with legal
protections and privileges analogous to those it has conferred on the political status of the citizen, and
for an analogous reason; namely, in order to make the capitalist, like the citizen, a man who can exert
legal power in the control of his own affairs”); cf. 9 COMM. ON INDUS. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT
AND TESTIMONY 8294 (1916).
15. Summers, supra note 12, at 157.
16. To compare Germany and the United Kingdom, see Ewan McGaughey, The
Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
135 (2016); McGaughey, supra note 8. The United Kingdom does have an older set of codetermination
laws, for instance the Oxford University Act 1854, requiring staff voice in university governance,
although universities do not (most of the time) have shareholders.
17. See generally DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S
LAST BEST WEAPON (2018).
18. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS § 12 (1776) (enabling the wealthier party to “hold out” longer in any negotiation). A second
cause is inequality in the ability to take collective action. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY §§ 8–12 (1848). A third cause is inequality in information. WILLIAM STANLEY
JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY § 74 (3d ed. 1888). Unequal bargaining power is both
a distributional and an efficiency problem (a fact that Ronald Coase and much “law and economics”
theory attempts to deny), because unfair distribution affects the motivation to work. BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 4, at 122 (“In the operation of the corporation the controlling group even if they own a large
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governance today has become monopolized not even by shareholders, but
by asset managers or banks, and all with “other people’s money.”19 The
evidence suggests this has deeply damaged efficiency and productivity
and is uncompetitive.
Part II addresses the political arguments. As a matter of principle,
there is no defensible theory, of “shareholder primacy” or otherwise, that
justifies asset managers and banks monopolizing votes in the economy
with other people’s labor or “other people’s money.”20 Part III addresses
the law. States could enact legislation that mirrors the current federal
proposals. Neither the preemption doctrine, nor antitrust law, prevent
states democratizing the economy through corporate law reform, not least
because state and federal laws do it already. Until the Presidency and
Congress regain their capacity to function and legislate,21 state
governments can lead. They can revive as laboratories of enterprise,22 and
recreate a living law that will restore democracy in America: a project still
at work. It can be done again because it was before. The next part turns to
how.
I. THE HISTORY OF LABOR’S VOTE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The principle of democracy at work was always part of the
movement towards democracy in politics: an inseparable need to hold
people in power accountable in every social institution.23 When Alexis de
Tocqueville came to America, he wrote about a “strong and independent”
block of stock, can serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense of the company than by
making profits for it.”); Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, Benedikt Herrmann & Frédéric Schneider, Social
Comparison in the Workplace: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 12 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 877
(2014); see also Ewan McGaughey, Behavioural Economics and Labour Law 7–9 (LSE Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 20/2014, 2014).
19. Cf. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914);
SMITH, supra note 18, § 107.
20. Theories of shareholder primacy assume shareholders bear residual risk in insolvency, when
in fact the beneficiaries of pensions or mutual funds do: asset managers control votes on other people’s
money. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA (2018);
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and
Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564 (2014) (Law reflecting people’s preferences have been
impossible at least since 1981.); Ewan McGaughey, Fascism-Lite in America (or the Social Ideal of
Donald Trump), BRITISH J. AM. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2018) (The decline of the democratic
process wrought by the Supreme Court since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).).
22. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (A
“[s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
23. Cf. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 2 (Henry Dale ed., Harper and
Bros. 1891) (ca 411 BC) (Pericles said, “Our government does not copy our neighbors, but is an
example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the
many and not of the few.”).
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community, where the American citizen had “an interest in it because he
shares in its management.”24 In 1834, even though democracy was a
privilege and freedom violently suppressed, Americans were still wedded
to a kind of equality: they were relatively wary about a one-share, onevote norm that departed too far from democracy in capital25 and were
attached to cumulative voting to represent multiple interest groups on
corporate boards.26 Stockholders in this time of pre-democratic politics
were the rich. They monopolized the votes in the economy.27 This did not
mean the dominance of capital over labor went unchallenged.
A. Towards Industrial Democracy? 1861 to 1916
Abraham Lincoln challenged the old system. His call for a
“government of the people by the people for the people”28 was shaped by
24. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DÉMOCRATIE EN AMÉRIQUE ch. 5 (1835).
25. See Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Second Report on the Further Provision
Necessary for Establishing Public Credit (Report on National Bank) (Dec. 13, 1790) reprinted in 7
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305, 334–39 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1963)
(“A vote for each share renders a combination, between a few principal [s]tockholders, to monopolise
the power and benefits of the Bank too easy. An equal vote to each [s]tockholder, however great or
small his interest in the institution, allows not that degree of weight to large stockholders, which it is
reasonable they should have, and which perhaps their security and that of the bank require. A prudent
mean is to be preferred.”). After this, one-share, one-vote was dominant, but often with limits. JOSEPH
G. BLANDI, MARYLAND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 1783–1852, at 65–69 (1934) (40% of charters
issued between 1849 and 1852 instituting voting ceilings.); JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION
IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS 1791–1875, at 309 (1949) (finding in New Jersey, 15% of
companies between 1796 and 1867 deviated from a one-ordinary-share, one-vote standard); Edwin
Merrick Dodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860, 60 AM. HIST. REV. 620 (1954) (finding
a general standard of a ten vote limit prevailed in most kinds of company); Alex Dreier, Shareholder
Voting Rules in 19th Century American Corporations: Law, Economics and Ideology (Apr. 24, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Yale Law School) (finding in Connecticut that 85% of charters
between 1789 and 1856 adhered to a one-ordinary-share, one-vote norm); see also Colleen A.
Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting
Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1361–65 (2006) (One-share, one-vote represented
entrenchment of plutocratic power.); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of
Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption (EGCI Law, Working Paper
No 219/2013, 2013).
26. E.g., People ex rel. Stevenson v. Higgins, 15 Ill. 110 (1853) (concerning trustees of a
hospital). Abraham Lincoln acted for Higgins. He lost on the point of who, precisely, was empowered
by common law to exercise the right of removal. Lincoln argued that it should only be the legislature,
the governor, or the Supreme Court, but not the hospital’s trustees, but the court felt the trustees too
could exercise the power of a motion.
27. See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 251 (2d
ed. 1886) (“It is frequently in the power of the corporation, through a majority vote of the shareholders,
to remove the directors or managing agents who have failed in their duty.”). It is noteworthy that
stockholder control appeared firmly dominant also over director compensation. Id. § 508 (noting that
it “would be contrary to established principles to allow the directors or other agents of a corporation
to fix their own compensation.”).
28. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in THE PORTABLE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 295 (Andrew Delbanco ed., 1992).
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how Lincoln envisaged economic power in his first annual message as
President in 1861. In a land torn by civil war, he warned against the
“approach of returning despotism.”29 This came from “the effort to place
capital on an equal footing with, if not above, labor in the structure of
government” and the assumption that “a hired laborer is fixed in that
condition for life.” “Labor,” said Lincoln, “is prior to and independent of
capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor and could never have existed if
labor had not first existed.”30
In the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, Lincoln made the
momentous step towards freedom of association, declaring all people who
were enslaved to not only be free but also to have the right to work for
“reasonable wages” and a guarantee of a job for “persons of suitable
condition . . . into the armed service.”31 Lincoln created the first public
pensions in 1862, for disabled army personnel,32 and in 1865 it seemed he
intended to go beyond, for all veterans.33 Over the trauma of the Civil War
and assassination, this was the basis of a constitution, a house less
divided,34 “which opens the way to all, gives hope to all, and consequent
energy and progress and improvement of condition to all.”35
Between the end of the Civil War and the start of the First World
War, three ideals that Lincoln embodied slowly took shape: (1) meaningful
freedom of association, (2) growing prosperity in pay and pensions, and
(3) growing commitment to an industrial democracy. All faced staunch
opposition. In 1842, Commonwealth v. Hunt had already approved the
29. Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1861), https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws?pid=29502 [https://perma.cc/QRM6-SMWH].
30. Id.
31. Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) (“I do order and declare that
all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are and henceforward shall
be free . . . . I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless
in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that in all cases when allowed they labor faithfully
for reasonable . . . such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the
United States.”).
32. An Act to Grant Pensions, ch. 166, § 1, 12 Stat. 566 (1862) (Army personnel who had since
March 4, 1861 been “disabled by reason of any wound received or disease contracted while in the
service of the United States” were entitled.).
33. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) in THE LITERARY WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 273 (1942) (appearing to envisage an extension but was assassinated just a month
later). He called “to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and
for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among
ourselves and with all nations.” Id.
34. Cf. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Acceptance of Nomination as United States Senator at the
Illinois Republican State Convention, Springfield, Illinois (June 16, 1858) reprinted in THE ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Mark E. Neely Jr. ed., Da Capo Press, Inc. 1982) (“A house divided against
itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do
not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease
to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other.”); Matthew 12:25.
35. Lincoln, supra note 29.
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right of labor unions to take collective action,36 abandoning English
common law conspiracy theory in Massachusetts.37 But nationwide there
were still three cases from 1842 to 1863 where unions on strike were held
to be conspiracies. From 1863 to 1880 there were at least fifteen.38 In 1869,
the Knights of Labor organized the first major union federation, but though
it committed to race and gender equality, it disavowed strikes. Also in
1869, the Supreme Court tacitly ensured corporations engaged in interstate
commerce had the right to freely establish and had mutual recognition.39
In 1875, American Express, then engaged in rail and post, started the first
occupational pension, but without any worker voice.40 It aimed to compel
worker loyalty. It asserted pensions were a gift that was made, not a right
that was earned nor a fund that labor could control.41
The paucity of voice at work and in capital was not surprising; it was
only in 1886 that the American Federation of Labor (AFL), which did
assert the right to strike, was formed.42 The situation before then was
captured by the U.S. Senate, Education and Labor Committee, led by
Henry W. Blair from 1883–1885. It issued no final Report but gathered
over 4000 pages of testimony from workers, unions, employers, journalists
and activists.43 Southern workers were riven by deprivation following
36. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 111 (1842). The Boston Journeymen
Bootmakers’ Society was charged with a common law conspiracy, argued to have been received from
English common law, for going on strike against employers who hired non-union workers that were
receiving less pay. Chief Justice Shaw said there was no liability at common law because people “are
free to work for whom they please, or not to work, if they so prefer . . . . [W]e cannot perceive, that it
is criminal for men to agree together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such a manner as
best to subserve their own interests.” Id. at 130. Note that a common law right to strike is further
dependent on the invalidity of contracts excluding the right or requiring imbalanced notice periods
before collective action can be taken. There would, of course, be little justification for a court to
enforce such an agreement, since consent and true agreement would be absent, unless perhaps the
workforce had negotiated a no-strike agreement through independent representatives.
37. See People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (holding it was an unlawful conspiracy
to strike for higher wages); see also R v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge (1721) 88 Eng. Rep. 9.
The year after Fisher, Judge Edwards convicted a tailors’ union for conspiracy on this precedent. The
response was a meeting of 27,000 workers which burned effigies of them both. Outrage spread in the
press. Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826–27 (1926).
38. Witte, supra note 37, at 82.
39. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869)
(holding that states were not allowed to attach special conditions to corporations doing interstate
business but could regulate insurance contracts). See generally Frederick Tung, Before Competition:
Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33 (2006).
40. WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27
(1976).
41. STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 22–24
(1997).
42. SELIG PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 118–24 (1922).
43. GORDON B. MCKINNEY, HENRY W. BLAIR’S CAMPAIGN TO REFORM AMERICA: FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO THE U.S. SENATE 110–11, 132–40 (2012) (giving an excellent summary of Blair’s
engagement over the years).
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emancipation without any meaningful property reform.44 This fact was
entrenched by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,
deciding that desegregation of public services was “unconstitutional.”45
The timeless dissent of Justice John Marshall Harlan urged that this left
people’s civil rights “practically at the mercy of corporations and
individuals wielding power under the States.”46 Northern workers were
struggling to secure basic wages, reduce their working hours, and have the
freedom to take collective action.47 Pensions were barely mentioned,
except for one witness who, though lucky enough to have a pension, said
that he laughed when people asked him if it was enough to support a
family.48
There were flickers of the future.49 A witness before the Committee
named George Storm, of cigar manufacturer Straiton & Storm, explained
how from 1879 he introduced an arbitration board—with four employee
and four management representatives, and one “neutral” representative—
to ensure wages or work conditions were “settled upon a fair basis.”50 His
employees belonged to unions, but he testified there were no strikes since
the board of arbitration began. He was adamant that it should never be a
replacement for unions and called employers who imagined it could be
“tricksters.”51 This was not equal representation on a board of directors,
but it was still remarkable. If we take Storm at his word, it was a
microcosm of joint industrial councils operating with collective
bargaining.52
The Senate Labor Commissioners’ proposed reforms were limited:
they began from an almost blank slate. Blair pushed to extend federal
44. Id. at 111.
45. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 55.
47. MCKINNEY, supra note 43, at 133–34.
48. 3 COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 48TH CONG., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
UPON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL AND TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE
395 (Comm. Print 1885) [hereinafter REPORT ON LABOR AND CAPITAL] (testimony of Edward L.
Davenport).
49. STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM: 1880–1940, at 121 (1976) (noting
that shop committees existed in 1833 but not where).
50. REPORT ON LABOR AND CAPITAL, supra note 48, at 803–19 (testimony of George Storm).
51. Id. at 806. (George Storm: “I have had employers come to me to inquire about this method
of arbitration, and how it worked, and, after taking all the trouble to explain it to them, they would say
in a sly manner, ‘Well, I suppose you have it all your own way, don’t you?’ These people are unfit to
have arbitration—they are tricksters. In speaking of arbitration, we must, therefore, leave all such
people out of account.”).
52. RAYMOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR
LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 15 (1992) (recording that from 1898 a Boston retail clothing
store called William Filene’s Sons, run by Edward A. and A. Lincoln Filene, delegated responsibility
for welfare, lunchroom and entertainment, and then from 1901 gave seats on an arbitration board.
They say, however, this was mainly as a mechanism to preempt collective bargaining with the union.).
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spending in education, particularly in the south, and for labor unions to
have legal personality. The education measures stalled amidst the
campaigns for Senate reelection in 1884.53 An Act did pass for unions to
incorporate, but they showed no interest.54 The most lasting reform was
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Act of 1884.55 But another fight soon
opened up: the Sherman Act of 1890 was meant to stop business
combinations acting in restraint of trade; instead, its first use was against
labor unions. In 1894, Chicago railroad workers struck against the Pullman
Palace Car Co.’s emaciating wage cuts, ostensibly to cope with the drop
in orders from economic depression.56 For instance, the monthly wage of
a painter, Mr. Rhodie, was cut from $65.28 in May 1893 to $12.52 by
Christmas. None of the managers’ salaries were reduced.57 If this was not
enough, many Pullman staff were housed by the Pullman Co., thus paying
it rent. Wage cuts with rent hikes meant employees got into debt, and so
were chained to the company. For all practical purposes, they were
indentured labor.
The American Railway Union opposed the Pullman management
because its principles stated “employees are entitled to a voice in fixing
wages and in determining the conditions of employment.”58 For exercising
the right to strike, the ARU leader and future socialist presidential
candidate, Eugene Debs, was imprisoned by an Illinois court, supposedly
enforcing a Sherman Act injunction.59 The decision was later upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in In re Debs on even broader grounds.60
53. MCKINNEY, supra note 43, at 139–40.
54. An Act to Legalize the Incorporation of National Trades Unions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 21–25 (1886)
(repealed 1926); U.S. STRIKE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE-JULY, 1894, S.
EXEC. DOC. No. 7, at liii (1895).
55. An Act to establish a Bureau of Labor, ch. 127, 23 Stat. 60 (1884).
56. U.S. STRIKE COMM’N, supra note 54, at xxxiv (“The testimony of the Pullman
company . . . has left its claim . . . in such loose and indefinite shape as to compel the conclusion that
the reduction in the repair department was not made with reference to these depression results, but was
part of a plan designed to reduce wages in every department to the lowest point possible to be reached
in the department most seriously affected by the depression. Some reduction of wages in all
departments was of course proper . . . but a uniform reduction as between departments so differently
situated in reference to revenue as the car-building and repair departments was not relatively just and
fair toward the repair-shop employees.”).
57. Id.
58. U.S. STRIKE COMM’N, supra note 54, at 148 (Eugene Debs quoting the American Railway
Union’s “declaration of principles”).
59. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 436 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894) (imposing an injunction on the striking
workers of the Pullman Company).
60. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (holding that the federal government could enforce the
injunction as part of its right to regulate interstate commerce, without considering the Sherman Act of
1890). But see Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (endorsing the imposition of damages on
unions). From a competition law perspective, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies
in American Law, 1880–1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988).
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Troops were sent into Chicago and shot thirty people. The subsequent
inquiry by the United States Strike Commission concluded that, instead of
trying to resolve disputes, the courts were still “poring over the laws of
antiquity in order to construe conspiracy out of labor unions.” In his
evidence, Debs argued that “Government ownership of the railroads is
decidedly better for the people than railroad ownership of [the]
Government.”61 Ultimately he favored, not state socialism, but “a
cooperative commonwealth as a substitute for the wage system.”62 The
Strike Commission recommended, more modestly, a government panel to
resolve disputes and wages, analogous to the Interstate Commerce
Commission.63 But the courts continued imposing liability on unions,64
and did little (until 1911) to stop capital combinations. Spurred by the
Sherman Act, the largest merger wave in United States history was
unfolding.65 Another Industrial Commission appointed by Congress
reported on labor relations in 1902 and finally recommended that state
laws begin to enact labor rights, particularly by reducing working time.66
The Supreme Court’s answer in 1905 was Lochner v. New York, ensuring
most economic and social experiment was “unconstitutional.”67
With labor rights suppressed, few employees had surplus savings for
pensions. But as the problems of old-age poverty spread, so did
experiments.68 Only one witness to the 1895 Strike Commission advocated
pensions for all rail workers.69 Some employers acted: by 1901, the
Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company had five officials running a
$200,000 fund, but all were employer-appointed.70 Courts asserted that
employers were “voluntarily” setting aside “a portion of its profits

61. U.S. STRIKE COMM’N, supra note 54, at 163.
62. Id. at 170.
63. Id. at Lii (recommending a three-member strike commission, plus a union representative, to
settle “disputes between railroads and their employees similar to those vested in the Interstate
Commerce Commission as to rates, etc.”).
64. E.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896) (Finding a union picket to be tortious
intimidation. In dissent, Justice Holmes said, “Combination on the one side is patent and powerful.
Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in
a fair and equal way.”).
65. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 ch. 20
(1991).
66. 19 U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 948 (1902).
67. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (playing out the consequences of Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
68. F. Spencer Baldwin, The Work of the Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions, 85
PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS’N 417 (1909) (remarking that there were no official statistics on the
extent of deprivation).
69. US STRIKE COMM’N, supra note 54, at 678.
70. E.g., George G. Tunell, The Pension System of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Company, 9 J. POL. ECON. 271 (1901).

708

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:697

belonging to shareholders,”71 not giving employees pay for their work.72
In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt extended a state pension to all army
veterans who reached age 65,73 but for retirement security almost everyone
else had to turn to private markets. One option was life insurance. In 1905,
this became the focus of the Armstrong Commission, with Charles Evans
Hughes as chief counsel. Equitable Life had hosted an opulent party for a
policyholder that caught media attention. The Commission uncovered
patterns of bribes, mismanagement, and self-dealing. The New York
legislative response was merely to limit insurers’ rights to own shares,
control banks, or invest in securities, but not to create a public system of
social security.74 In 1909, Louis Brandeis tried to launch a different
initiative in Massachusetts.75 Insurance, he said, had become “legalized
robbery.”76 He promoted a voluntary “social alternative.” But though he
consulted three hundred unions, the scheme attracted few subscribers.77
On the other hand, a growing number of states—partly inspired by a
Massachusetts commission78 and the United Kingdom’s Old Age Pension
Act 1908—started pensions for public sector workers, particularly
teachers.79 Yet the courts were ready to strike down reform. In 1914,
Arizona had a popular initiative and a referendum for a new pension
scheme to cover everyone.80 In State Board of Control v. Buckstegge, the
71. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898) endorsed in Menke v.
Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944). This view expired by the time of ERISA in 1974. See Howell
v. United States, 775 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985).
72. Cf. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898) (Green, J.,
dissenting) (“A promise, founded upon a valuable consideration inuring to the benefit of a promisor,
to pay a sum of money upon specified contingencies, is not a promise to make a gift, even though the
parties call it so . . . it constitutes a contract founded upon a valuable consideration.”).
73. Executive Order No. 78 extended the Disability Pension Act 1890 which had recast the
previous 1862 law. See Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 124–
27 (2001).
74. Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance
Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 656–57 (1993).
75. For an interesting biographical comparison, see Paul Brickner, Different Styles and Similar
Values: The Reformer Roles of Charles Evans Hughes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis in Gas, Electric,
and Insurance Regulation, 33 IND. L. REV. 893 (2000).
76. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, LIFE INSURANCE: THE ABUSES AND THE REMEDIES: AN ADDRESS
DELIVERED BEFORE THE COMMERCIAL CLUB OF BOSTON (1905).
77. Louis D. Brandeis, Massachusetts Savings-Bank Insurance and Pension System, 11
PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS’N. 409 (1909) (optimistically arguing this “social alternative” avoided
the “compulsory” nature of the German pension, and unlike National Insurance in the UK, the need to
buy insurance individually would both make “workingmen independent,” and avoid “burdening
general taxation”).
78. REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION ON OLD AGE PENSIONS, ANNUITIES AND
INSURANCE (1910).
79. See W. CARSON RYAN, JR. & ROBERTA KING, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF EDUC.,
STATE PENSION SYSTEMS FOR PUBLIC-SCHOOL TEACHERS 5–8 (1916).
80. An Act Providing for an Old Age and Mothers’ Pension and Making Appropriation Therefor,
1914 Leg., Reg Sess. (Ariz. 1914) (winning a massive 67.57% of the vote).
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Arizona Supreme Court declared it “unconstitutional” because there was
no means testing. Chief Justice Henry D. Ross argued that apparently a
“taxpayer ought not to be made . . . to help pay pensions to those who have
enough” because he could “think of no principle of law or justice that
could be invoked . . . that required him to do so.”81
Although courts’ aggression to labor grew in Debs, Lochner, and
Buckstegge, Congress began to act. It established a Commission on
Industrial Relations in 1912, after two renegade union members dynamited
the Los Angeles Times building.82 The Commission led directly to the
Clayton Act of 1914 § 6, proclaiming the “labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce,” and removing labor from antitrust
liability.83 Samuel Gompers, the American Federation of Labor President,
said it was “the Magna Carta of America’s workers.”84 But just as fast,
Coppage v. Kansas held over powerful dissent that state laws, which
prohibited employers demanding that workers forgo the right to a union,
were “unconstitutional.”85 “No union or no job” was the choice that the
Supreme Court gave American workers until the Wall Street Crash.
The Commission’s later hearings gave valuable insight into three
fundamentally different views over the future of economic governance,
represented by three key witnesses: JD Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and
Louis Brandeis. First, Rockefeller, the oligarch of Standard Oil, which was
broken up in 1911,86 was brought to the Commission because of a strike
at his Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. In April 1914, company guards machinegunned twenty-five people, including eleven children, camped in tents. He
displayed contrition and hired William MacKenzie King, the ex-Canadian
Minister of Labor and Canadian Prime Minister from 1921 to 1930 and
1935 to 1948, to consult on resolving the unrest. Rockefeller promised to
introduce a board of workers and managers where “questions affecting
conditions of employment can be discussed and grievances examined.”87
Rockefeller’s own directors opposed even this.88 So did the United Mine
81. State Bd. of Control v. Buckstegge, 158 P. 837, 842 (Ariz. 1916).
82. The United States labor movement, including Gompers and Debs, initially believed the two
accused McNamara brothers were innocent, until they finally pleaded guilty in the trial. See Eugene
V. Debs, The McNamara Case and the Labor Movement, 12 INT’L SOCIALIST REV. 397 (1912); see
also Herbert Shapiro, The McNamara Case: A Crisis of the Progressive Era, 59 S. CAL. L.Q. 271
(1977).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
84. Samuel Gompers, Labor and the War: The Movement for Universal Peace Must Assume the
Aggressive, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 849, 860 (1914).
85. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
86. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
87. 8 COMM. ON INDUS. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY 7766 (1916).
88. RAYMOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR
LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 21–25 (1992).
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Workers of America because it was “not a union and can never be
recognized as such by the American labor movement . . . an organization
so created and so controlled.”89 Indeed, Rockefeller had no intention of
working with unions. He wanted to replace them and privatize freedom of
association. The plan’s constitution explicitly said, “officials of the
company may decide any question without consulting committees or
employees’ representatives.”90
Second, as a more enlightened and thoughtful representative of
business, Andrew Carnegie gave evidence. The popular Scottish rail and
steel magnate had often said the “man who dies thus rich dies disgraced”
and that “the millionaire will be but a trustee of the poor.”91 He was a
trustee of Cornell University from 1890 but was equally tarnished by labor
conflict from the Homestead Strike of 1892, where twelve people were
killed and twenty-three had been injured. Carnegie defended himself by
saying, “I drew the line at contract breaking,” that it “was the first time I
had found labor, . . . ready to break a contract,” (dictated by the employer)
“and it was the last.”92 Yet it was clear that, while Carnegie charmed the
Commission and the audience93 and reminisced about the supposedly
“great times” he had doing collective bargaining,94 he was committed to
reform. Initially, Carnegie spoke of workers becoming shareholders so
89. Id. at 26 (quoting the Denver Post (Sept. 26, 1915)).
90. Id. at 28 (quoting BEN M. SELEKMAN & MARY VAN KLEEK, EMPLOYEES’ REPRESENTATION
IN COAL MINES: A STUDY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REPRESENTATION PLAN OF COLORADO FUEL AND IRON
COMPANY 291 (1924)).
91. Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 653–64 (1889).
92. 9 COMM. INDUS. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY 8289 (1916).
93. Id. at 8294 shows a typical exchange:
Mr. Carnegie: Undoubtedly. I knew them by name, I delighted and you see behind my
back they always call me Andy. I like that, and I would rather have it than “Andrew” or
“Mr. Carnegie.” There is no sympathy about that. But you have your men calling you
“Andy” and you can get along with them. [Laughter.]
Chairman Walsh: I have had no difficulty in restraining the expression of the audience until
you came.
Mr. Carnegie: [Laughter.] That is all right.
Chairman Walsh: We must observe order.
Mr. Carnegie: Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you upon having such an audience and to see
how many ladies are here. Do you know, one of the greatest triumphs in this age? It is the
elevation of woman. [Laughter.]
Chairman Walsh: Ladies and gentlemen, if you will please keep quiet a few minutes I will
ask Mr. Carnegie to repeat that sentence, as some of you may not have heard it. If you will
keep quiet, I will ask him what it was. What was it that you said, Mr. Carnegie?
Mr. Carnegie: I want to tell you something, that I never can forget. I was traveling in
China . . . .
94. Id. (Carnegie said he “was only too glad when the workmen came. I felt pretty sure that if
they came to consult with me that we would part all right.” This appears difficult to square with his
later observation that if someone was “a director in the corporation he naturally would not hear of the
trouble at the works and would not feel the responsibility.”).
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that “workmen and capitalists” were “pulling and owning the same
boat.”95 But after the Commission, the practical steps he took were to
improve pensions and, critically, to give staff a voice in them.96 In 1915,
Carnegie asked Dr. Henry Pritchett, president of the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching, to create a new plan for universities,
one that involved “some form of oversight” by the policyholders.97
Carnegie donated the startup capital for a new Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association (TIAA). Members elected a quarter of the twenty
person board, albeit from nominees screened by a committee.98 TIAA’s
first board was appointed by the Carnegie Foundation, but then member
representation was implemented with one trustee a year from 1921 to
1926.
Third, there was Louis Brandeis, the “people’s lawyer.” He argued
that the “one cause” that was “fundamental” to industrial unrest was “the
contrast between our political liberty and our industrial absolutism.” “The
individual employee,” said Brandeis, “has no effective voice or vote.”
Large corporations made industrial absolutism inevitable, and instead the
law should reform to follow what unions would achieve in collective
agreements, if the playing field were fair.99 If there was one goal, it was
“the attainment of rule by the people, and that involved industrial
democracy as well as political democracy.”100 Brandeis set out general
principles, rather than specifics. In the end, the Commission’s leading
Report recommended reforms following the United Kingdom Trade
Disputes Act 1906;101 its model of industrial democracy was synonymous
with collective bargaining, not writing rights to votes at work into law.
Other Commissioners only recommended improvements to industrial
arbitration.102 These options—votes at work, collective bargaining, and
arbitration—set the essential frame of the debate on how labor law
95. Id. at 8288 (“When workmen were made shareholders they were sold shares in the company
upon a very liberal basis and guarded against loss. I consider this the greatest of all steps forward yet
taken for making workmen and capitalists fellow workmen indeed, pulling and owning the same boat.
This can not fail to prove highly profitable to both.”); cf. Andrew Carnegie, The Future of Labor, 33
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 15, 17 (1909) (calling for workers as “part owners having a right
to vote with their fellow-proprietors, and sharing in the profits”).
96. See Richard L. Hannah, The Control of Pensions: A Brief History and Possibilities for the
Future, 40 MGMT. DECISION 938, 939 (2000) (noting that Carnegie pre-funded his steel worker
pensions, thus placing him at the progressive end).
97. WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH, IT’S MY RETIREMENT MONEY TAKE GOOD CARE OF IT: THE
TIAA-CREF STORY 35 (1990).
98. Id.
99. COMM. INDUS. RELATIONS, supra note 87, at 7659–7700.
100. Id.
101. 1 COMM. INDUS. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY 137 (1916) (using the U.K.
Trade Disputes Act 1906 as a model for U.S. law).
102. Id.
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developed in the next thirty years. Brandeis wrote after the hearings, that
to create a “living law,” the ideal had been “[a] government of the people,
by the people and for the people.” Now it was “[d]emocracy and social
justice.”103
B. The Slow Deal: 1916 to 1946
From the First World War to the end of the Second, America clearly
became a more social democracy, but it was a slow deal. Three main shifts
were that (1) workers’ savings flooded the stock market, separating
ownership and control of companies more than ever, and these new
worker-shareholders had to fight against disenfranchisement; (2) the first
worker representatives were placed on boards of directors, and this
practice was even reflected in a Massachusetts Law of 1919; but (3)
business tried to hijack the language of “industrial democracy” with sham
work councils that shielded management authority. Labor fought back
with collective bargaining, culminating in Roosevelt’s New Deal.
The changes of labor’s fortunes were fundamental causes of the Wall
Street Crash and the Great Depression because the stock market was built
on labor’s capital. Even with the Clayton Act’s minimal freedoms,
prosperity grew, and people wanted to save for old age. While Lochner
and Buckstegge suppressed statewide social security, the Tariff Act of
1913 reintroduced a progressive income tax104 and enabled employers to
deduct pension payments and deferred annuity premiums as a business
expense.105 The Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920 set up a model that
many state governments, as employers, followed, while a trickle of private
employers set up workplace pensions. The Revenue Act of 1921 exempted
any profit sharing or stock bonus trust used “for the exclusive benefit of
some or all . . . employees.”106 By 1926, the Internal Revenue Service also
exempted pension funds.107 When companies built up pension savings,
they paid no tax until employees received and spent the money. Despite
103. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461 (1916).
104. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (striking down the progressive
income tax; however, in 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment was passed, discussed in Brushaber v. Union
Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1 (1916)).
105. This meant that smaller sums of profit were taxable. The Revenue Act of 1918 said that
employers who separately constituted funds could claim deductions. SASS, supra note 41, at 102–03.
106. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247. The Act was primarily
a tax cut initiative led by Andrew Mellon. Mellon had inherited his father’s bank, diversified it into
industry, acquired the position of Secretary of the Treasury, and became the third highest American
taxpayer by the mid-1920s.
107. See Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 165, 45 Stat. 792, 839 (updated in 1932,
1934 and 1936; it also allowed deductions for past accumulations, but the deduction had to be spread
over ten years); Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9, 33–34; Revenue Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 219(f), 43 Stat. 253, 276–77.
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the tax reforms, most workers did not have the option of a workplace
pension.108
For labor, workplace pensions were problematic. The law still
framed pensions as a “gift.” Employers threatened to withdraw workplace
pensions if workers joined unions. This is why AFL President Samuel
Gompers insisted that labor should control pensions alone until the
government established an old age pension.109 But Arizona’s public
pension plan in 1916 was not the only one to be struck down. In 1923, a
Nevada law was passed, but it was amended in 1925 so that counties could
opt out.110 In 1925, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down its
fledgling state pension because apparently redistributing money for
“benevolent” purposes was “unconstitutional.”111 By 1929, only
Montana’s old age pension remained. Just 3.7 million U.S. workers had
workplace pensions, around 10% of the non-agricultural labor force.
Pensions that unions controlled were small and many failed during the
Depression.112 In railways, where unionization was high, around 85% of
people had pensions. But again, a substantial number were unilaterally
reduced or closed when Wall Street crashed.113
Denied social security by their courts and denied workplace pensions
by their employers, Americans had to save for old age somewhere else:
the stock market. This drove the great separation of ownership and control

108. JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 398–403
(1936).
109. See LUTHER CONANT JR., A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS 22
(1922) (Quoting Samuel Gompers, “Paternalism either in government or in industry is abhorrent. It
takes away the initiative of the workers who should themselves prepare for old age . . . . Until the
Government itself establishes an old age pension system, labor will insist that pension systems shall
be controlled by the workers themselves, without any connection whatever with the employers.”).
110. See Abraham Epstein, The American State Old Age Pension System in Operation, 170
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 107, 107 (1933).
111. Busser v. Snyder, 128 A. 80, 83 (Pa. 1925); see also Ira Jewell Williams, The Attack Upon
the Supreme Court, 7 CONST. REV. 143, 239 (1923); Gifford Pinchot, Old Age Assistance in
Pennsylvania: Righting the Neglects of Yesterday, 14 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 288 (1924).
112. MURRAY WEBB LATIMER, TRADE UNION PENSION SYSTEMS: AND OTHER
SUPERANNUATION AND PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 8–9 (1932); SASS, supra note 41, at 125–27.
113. D. Shapiro, Employee Pensions in Collective Bargaining, 59 YALE L.J. 678, 680 (1950).
Mellon’s response to the crash in November 1929, according to Herbert Hoover, was to “liquidate
labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate. It will purge the rottenness out of
the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more
moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up from less competent people.”
EDWARD GALE AGRAN, HERBERT HOOVER AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF MIDDLE-CLASS
AMERICA 161 (2016).
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from 1916 to 1919, later described by Gardiner Means.114 Workers saving
for retirement flooded the stock market, which rocketed from 1916.115
Consistent data on stock market growth and pension savings in the
early twentieth century are hard to find over time.116 However, we know
that when public pension spending is higher (because the state replaces a
proportion of income in retirement), people save less for retirement
themselves. When the public pension is smaller (fixed at a minimum,
safety-net level), people save more in occupational pensions, life
insurance, mutual funds, and private savings. This money floods stock
markets and creates a diversified shareholder base. This is why in OECD
countries, as public pension spending rises, dispersion of shareholding
falls. As the Figure 1 shows, countries like Germany or France with
income-linked state pensions have many block shareholders.117 Countries
like the United Kingdom or the United States with minimum statepensions have a massive dispersion of shareholders, as the blockholders
are flooded out.

114. Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44, Q. J. ECON.
561, 562 (1930); see also 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AS A
WHOLE 316 (Friedrich Engels ed., 1894) (“In stock companies the function [of appropriating labor] is
divorced from capital ownership, hence also labour is entirely divorced from ownership of means of
production and surplus-labour. This result of the ultimate development of capitalist production is a
necessary transitional phase towards the reconversion of capital into the property of producers,
although no longer as the private property of the individual producers, but rather as the property of
associated producers, as outright social property.”); Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership
and Control in American Industry, 46 Q.J. ECON. 68 (1931).
115. See Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been so Little Block Holding in
America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS
GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 640 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (charting data on the
number of shareholders at AT&T, Pennsylvania Railroad and U.S. Steel, taking off from 1916).
116. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 15 tbl.3, 46 app. (2003) (Showing the
“[e]volution of stock market capitalization over GDP.” This shows, in snapshots of 1913, 1929, 1938,
and so on, the dramatic growth in U.S. stock market capitalization, as well as the U.K., Germany and
22 other countries. Its use is difficult because GDP fluctuates. Ideally, stock market capitalization
figures over time could be correlated with public pension spending over time.).
117. The data in Figure 1 comes from JAMES SHINN & PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICAL POWER
AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005).
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Figure 1

Before the Wall Street Crash, extraordinary investment growth
meant a mass base of small investors. They lacked organization or
bargaining power. By 1925, a growing number of companies had begun
issuing nonvoting shares.118 Then, the Dodge Motor company was taken
over by an investment bank, Dillon Read & Co.,119 and made a huge $160
million share issue. Every share was nonvoting, and all of the shares were
bought. Economist William Ripley led an outcry,120 saying nonvoting
shares “strike at the very tap-root of our capitalistic system” because
“power and responsibility must ever be yoked together,” to stop the
“absolute control by intermediaries—most commonly bankers.”121 Many
118. W.H.S. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40
Q.J. ECON. 353, 355, 361 (1926) (Showing 16 issues of nonvoting shares in 225 companies, sometimes
with no votes, sometimes with limited votes. In 1898, International Silver Co. issued stock with no
votes until 1902 and restricted after.).
119. The Dodge brothers, from the notorious Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich.
1919), had just died.
120. William Z. Ripley (1867–1941) was a complicated figure, which probably accounts for him
being less well known, despite the resonance of his work today. He was an overt xenophobe, viewing
both black people and women as less than competent to exercise political rights. After the Wall Street
Crash, which many people credited him with predicting, Ripley suffered a series of nervous
breakdowns and retired in 1933.
121. William Z. Ripley, Two Changes in the Nature and Conduct of Corporations, 11 PROC.
ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y. 143, 143–46. (1926) reprinted in 67 CONG. REC. 7719.
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argued dispersed shareholders were unwilling or unworthy. Ripley replied
that at least they “might always be stimulated to assert themselves,”122 and
a rising corporate lawyer, Adolf A. Berle, added that at least with votes
“there is always a latent power which can be exercised whenever the
majority chooses to act.”123
The campaign was successful enough for Ripley to be invited by
President Calvin Coolidge to the White House.124 On January 27, 1926,
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) responded to the
disenfranchisement outcry with a policy statement, that they would “give
careful thought to the matter of voting control.” This was eventually
hardened into a rule after the New Deal.125 Even more, the new Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) would eventually pressure the NYSE to
issue Rule 452,126 preventing brokers from voting on their depositors’
shares without instructions, either on mergers or when it might “affect
substantially the rights or privileges of such.”127 However, the SEC
continued to allow voting upon “routine” matters, including an
uncontested election for the board of directors.128
122. Stevens, supra note 117, at 383 (objecting that while bondholders claims to interest would
be enforceable, the voteless shareholder has no enforceable right).
123. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. REV. 673, 675
(1926); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Participating Preferred Stock, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 306
(1926).
124. See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) (introduced by
Woodrow Wilson).
125. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 19, 48 Stat. 881, 898–99
(enabling the SEC to oversee and veto NYSE rules). On May 7, 1940, a “Statement of Listing
Requirements as to Preferred Stock Voting Rights” confidently proclaimed, “Since 1926, The New
York Stock Exchange has refused to list non-voting common stock.” Similarly, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 18, 54 Stat. 789, 817–21, required the capital structure
in investment companies to be one-share, one-vote for common stock. Contra Joel Seligman, Equal
Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 687, 698 (1986).
126. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(b) regulates proxy voting.
127. Richard Maidman, Voting Rights of After-Record-Date Shareholders: A Skeleton in a Wall
Street Closet, 71 YALE L.J. 1205, 1215 (1962); see also Aktiengesetz [AkGt] [German Stock
Corporation Act] Law of Jan. 30, 1937, RGBL I (Ger.) (describing voting instructions); Mark J. Roe,
Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J.
1936, 1975, 1977 (1993) (arguing that “populist” reasons existed for U.S. banks becoming smaller,
but does not explore this element of the law; the German experience with bank voting on deposited
shares presents a stark contrast); Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 57 (1966) (noting comparisons with the Aktiengesetz
1965 § 135).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (Supp. 1965) gave authority for further rule making by the SEC, but
nothing was done immediately. Broker voting typically supported management. See JAMES E. HEARD
& HOWARD D. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 22 (1987); Henry
G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1443 (1964). On the
other, general aspects of Manne’s work and its contemporary reception, see Adolf A. Berle, Modern
Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433–49 (1962).
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Although they were not completely disenfranchised, small
shareholders still lacked information. The law did not guarantee that
adequate information was disclosed about the securities they bought. After
the fact, the dominant economic literature has theorized the Wall Street
Crash was caused by a classic speculative bubble,129 or by the Federal
Reserve’s policy on money supply.130 At the time, the institutional cause
of the speculative bubble, rather than human irrationality, was recognized
to be the absence of disclosure regulation. The Securities Act of 1933—
directly inspired by Berle and Means’s Book III—resolved this.131 The
larger question was that, if that regulation had always been lacking before,
why were the bubble and bust so tremendous this time? The answer is the
historically unprecedented volume of American workers saving for
retirement: Wall Street crashed labor’s capital.
How did labor rights evolve from the War to the crash? In 1918,
Eugene V. Debs had been sentenced to prison again, this time for opposing
the war,132 and he ran on the Socialist ticket for President in 1920 from
prison. “No job or no union” employment contracts remained common
from Coppage v. Kansas until the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932. Further,
in 1921, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering held the right to strike in
solidarity with workers of other employers had no immunity under the
Clayton Act.133
On the other hand, one year after entering World War One, on April
8, 1918, a National War Labor Board was established by the Department
of Labor.134 To smooth war production and avoid strikes,135 it promoted
work councils, collective bargaining, and arbitration, not as alternatives to
one another but as complements. The Board had five representatives
nominated by the National Conference Board, five by the American
Federation of Labor, and two “public” representatives agreed to by each.136
It heard labor dispute appeals and had an inspectorate office to enforce
agreed standards. It urged employers to set up work councils on the same
129. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH ch. 10 (1954); JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 149 (1936).
130. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867–1960 (1963) (arguing that the Great Depression’s cause was that the
government allowed the monetary supply to shrink, and it should have kept all banks going as the
lender of last resort).
131. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 289–331.
132. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
133. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (holding that secondary strike
action was unlawful because the Clayton Act of 1914 § 20 referred to immunity for trade disputes
between an “employer and employees”).
134. This was established as a separate entity in 1913 on the last day of the Taft presidency.
135. See generally Richard B. Gregg, National War Labor Board, 33 HARV. L. REV. 39 (1919).
136. Id. at 40.
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model to settle disputes.137 To attain its goals, the Board had no express
enforcement power, but was backed by the ability to withdraw government
contracts and had emergency powers to commandeer factory
production.138 From the Clayton Act of 1914 to the creation of the Board
in 1918, union membership was growing and inequality shrinking. But at
the end of the War, with Republicans winning the Senate election in
November 1918, employers flouted its orders. On August 12, 1919, the
Board was ended.139
Before the Board shut down, a remarkable law was passed putting
workers on company boards. In April 1919, the newly elected Governor
of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge, signed an Act that a “manufacturing
corporation may provide by by-law for the nomination and election by its
employees of one or more of them as members of its board of directors.”140
This is still on the books today, in § 23 of the Massachusetts Laws chapter
on business corporations,141 and is therefore the world’s oldest
codetermination law continuously in force. The option was adopted in part
by the Dennison Manufacturing Co. at Framingham,142 but in reality the
law codified what had already become a growing social practice. By 1922,
a Boston clothing store, William Filene’s Sons, enabled employees to
effectively choose four of the eleven members of the board of directors, a
practice that emerged from growing employee involvement since 1898.143
137. See NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., REPORT NO. 21, WORKS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED
STATES 8 (1919).
138. Gregg, supra note 135, at 45.
139. Louis L. Jaffe, Post-War Labor Relations: The Contributions of the War Labor Board, 29
IOWA L. REV. 276 (1944) (“Not more than three years later the Steel Industry had smashed the Unions
and underwritten the Open Shop Era of the Twenties. It is, of course, true that the Board worked out
in considerable detail the meaning of the right to collective bargaining: it forbade individual contracts,
discharge for union activity, etc. It thus gave concreteness to an idea which only a decade later bore
fruit. It insisted on the ‘living’ or ‘minimum’ wage and one observer believed (in 1919) that it had
established the principle as an ‘actuality’; yet as we know it failed to educate the Supreme Court in
this respect and certainly much of Industry remained unconverted.”).
140. An Act to Enable Manufacturing Corporations to Provide for the Representation of Their
Employees on the Board of Directors, 1919 Mass. Acts 45.
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 23 (2018); see also N.J. REV. STAT. § 14.9:1-3 (1957)
(repealed).
142. Calvert C. Magruder, Labor Copartnership in Industry, 35 HARV. L. REV. 910, 915–19
(1921) (describing how the Dennison Manufacturing Company at Framingham, Massachusetts, with
over 3000 staff, gave voting power to 368 managerial employees, while non-managers had voice in a
consultative works committee).
143. RAYMOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMO J. GREINER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR
LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 15 (1992) (In 1898, William Filene’s Sons had delegated
responsibility to workers for welfare, running the canteen and entertainment, and from 1901 had
allocated employee seats on an arbitration board. This would, however, be seen today as an illegal
sham company union.); EARL J. MILLER, WORKMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN INDUSTRIAL
GOVERNMENT 39–40 (1922) (“All employees, including salaried officials, by virtue of being
employed in the store, are members of the Filene cooperative association . . . . There are eleven
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In other states, by 1919 there were at least two plans: at Procter and
Gamble and at the General Ice Delivery Company of Detroit.144 A more
complex arrangement, yet adopted by at least twenty companies by 1919,
was developed by John Leitch: workers elected a “House of
Representatives,” foremen a “Senate,” top management a “Cabinet,” and
for a proposal to become “law,” it had to pass all three. This was first
employed at the Packard Piano Company in 1913, although its fate is
unclear.145 Many of these systems tied employees to buy stocks, but not
always.146 For example, in New York, the Dutchess Bleachery at
Wappingers Falls had a five member board of directors, one appointed by
a subsidiary board representing employees.147 Jett Lauck recorded that in
1926 there were at least eight companies with employee representation on
a board of directors, five through voluntary action, and three through stock
purchase.148 On these grounds alone, it is clear that Clyde Summers’
opinion that the United States had “no experience with employee
representation on corporate boards” went too far.149
Work councils were another form of representation, but after the War
Labor Board was gone employers pushed to retool them as replacements
for unions, not complements. In 1919, the National Industry Conference
Board (NICB), the major American employer organization,150 found in a
survey of 225 work council plans that 120 had been created under Federal
government auspices and 105 on the employers’ initiative.151 The NICB
argued councils could quell labor unrest and improve productivity, but its
members on the Board of Directors. The employees nominate six members for this board, and the
stock-holders of the company choose four from this panel of six. These four employee members have
the same powers as the ones representing the employers.”).
144. NEIL M. CLARK, COMMON SENSE IN LABOR MANAGEMENT 28–29 (1919) (The Proctor &
Gamble plan was not yet instituted.).
145. Milton Derber, The Idea of Industrial Democracy in America: 1915–1935, 8 LAB. HIST. 3
(1967).
146. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS UNITS 130–31 (1931) (Employee representation in management is not
always associated with employee stock ownership.).
147. Id. at 130.
148. See JETT W. LAUCK, POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1776–1926, chs. 3, 6
(1926); Paul F. Gemmill, The Literature of Employee Representation, 42 Q.J. ECON. 479, 492 (1928)
(describing the five “torchbearers of industrial democracy” that “stand out above all others as
indicating a sincerity of purpose and as offering a basis for future constructive action” as (1) William
Filene’s Sons, (2) the Dutchess Bleachery, (3) the Dennison Manufacturing Co., (4) the A. Nash Co.,
and (5) Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.).
149. Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and
Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. SEC. REG. 155, 155 (1982) (“The United States has had no experience
with employee representation on corporate boards, apart from the small number of employee-owned
enterprises.”).
150. This is now The Conference Board. It was established in 1916. The two other main lobby
groups for employers are the Business Roundtable and the US Chamber of Commerce.
151. See generally NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 137.
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enthusiasm seemed conditional on an employer’s supposedly unalienable
“right to employ and discharge, the direction of the working forces . . . the
management of the business . . . reserved exclusively to the company.”152
Workers and unions were not interested in this kind of work council,
because without binding legal rights it was a sham: a dishonest alternative
to collective bargaining. By 1925, 1,177,037 employees were covered by
such work councils. This relatively low level suggests the initiatives were
far more about staving off trade unions than managements implementing
an obvious efficiency measure.153 Nevertheless, the NICB was intent on
spreading the idea that its plans still embodied the true definition of
“industrial democracy.”154
After the Wall Street Crash, labor and capital reform also became a
question of equality. President Roosevelt’s Federal Reserve Chair from
1934, Marriner Stoddard Eccles, later wrote that the crash became a
Depression because “hoarded funds” meant the “distribution of wealth”
was not enough “to provide [people] with buying power equal to the
amount of goods and services offered.”155 To change this, government
support for unions became critical. The National Industrial Relations Act
of 1933 guaranteed a charter of labor rights and would have promoted
sectoral collective bargaining. It was struck down as “unconstitutional.”156
Instead, the reframed National Labor Relations Act of 1935 proclaimed its
goal to remedy “inequality of bargaining power” between employees “and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms.” Although
the new National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) focused only on building
enterprise bargaining among local unions, the Act gave private sector
workers federal rights to unionize, collectively bargain, and take-strike
action.157 As the Act’s sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner said, “democracy
in industry must be based upon the same principles as democracy in
government.”158
152. See generally NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., REPORT NO. 21, WORKS COUNCIL MANUAL
SUPPLEMENTAL RESEARCH (1920) (noting that union members should not be discriminated against).
153. NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., REPORT NO. 32, THE GROWTH OF WORKS COUNCILS IN
THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 5 (1925).
154. See generally NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., REPORT NO. 50, EXPERIENCE WITH WORKS
COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES (1922).
155. MARRINER S. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS: PUBLIC AND PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS
75–77 (1951) (“[W]hile savings that are invested in new enterprises are beneficial not only to savers
but also to the entire economy, savings that find no outlet and accumulate as idle or hoarded funds
interrupt the flow of national income and result in a depression. As mass production has to be
accompanied by mass consumption, mass consumption, in turn, implies a distribution of wealth—not
of existing wealth, but of wealth as it is currently produced—to provide men with buying power equal
to the amount of goods and services offered by the nation’s economic machinery.”).
156. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
157. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 §§ 7–8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2012).
158. 79 Cong. Rec. 7571 (1935); see also N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2018, at 1.
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And now that people had something to organize for, they did. Even
without widespread sectoral bargaining, union membership soared. So did
employers’ enthusiasm for company “unions.” By 1935, 3,100 companies
with 2.6 million workers had company “unions,” and over two-thirds of
them had arisen since 1933.159 In March 1934, Wagner had urged publicly
that sham unions should be suppressed because otherwise employers
would sit “on both sides of the table” or pull “the strings behind the
spokesmen.”160 The NLRA of 1935 § 8(a)(2) made it unlawful to interfere
with, or support, any labor organization. Under § 2(5), a labor organization
meant anything where employees participated to deal with disputes or
terms and conditions at work.161 In the first major case in 1939, NLRB v.
Newport News Shipbuilding Co.,162 the NLRB ordered disestablishment of
a company “work council” at the Eastern Seaboard’s largest docks,
operating since 1927, so that an independent union could replace it. It
resolved disputes and balloted employees, but the Supreme Court held it
was unlawful because, like the NICB model, no decision of this “work
council” could be implemented and the plan could not be amended without
management approval.163 The law strictly outlawed sham participation, but
§ 8(a)(2) also lacked a positive model of work councils that unions could
pursue.
How did the New Deal change social security? Reform followed a
similar pattern of social action, court repression, and federal legislation.
159. Johanna Oreskovic, Capturing Volition Itself: Employee Involvement and the TEAM Act,
19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 229, 241 (2014) (citing Hearings on S. 1958: Before the Committee
on Education and Labor, 74th Cong. 40 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner, Chairman, Comm. Pub.
Lands and Surveys), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935, at 1416 (1985)).
160. Hearings on H.R. 6228 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong. 15 (1935); see also
Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1934, at 1.
Wagner, born in Germany, was acutely aware that in May 1933, Hitler’s Nazi regime had violently
seized the union movement, setting up the state controlled Deutsche Arbeitsfront. It was “probable
that his own origins made Wagner particularly sensitive to the barbarities perpetrated by those who
had assumed power in the land of his birth.” J. JOSEPH HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER
AND THE RISE OF URBAN LIBERALISM 268 (1968); see also Letter from Robert F. Wagner to J.B.
Mayer (Jan. 16, 1934). Wagner was among the first to condemn Hitler’s regime. Robert F. Wagner
Papers, Wagner Speech File, Mar. 27, 1933; Robert F. Wagner Papers, International Affairs File,
1933–1939.
161. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2) (2012) (Section
152(5) states that it is an unfair labor practice “to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.” Section 152(5)
states that “a labor organization means any . . . employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.”).
162. NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
163. Id. at 250 (disestablishment of the plan was the “only effective way of wiping the slate clean
and affording the employees an opportunity to start afresh in organizing for the adjustment of their
relations with the employer.”).
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First, California, Wyoming, New York, and Massachusetts had introduced
pensions by 1930, and almost half the states followed by 1933.164 Second,
the Roosevelt administration passed the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934,
with a compulsory contributory scheme for railway workers, vested in the
U.S. Treasury and managed by a government board. The Supreme Court
in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co. struck it down.165
Echoing the reasoning in Buckstegge, Justice Owen Roberts, writing for
the majority of the Court, stated that employers subsidizing employees of
other companies was “an unnecessarily harsh and arbitrary imposition if
the plan is to be what on its face it imports—a joint adventure with
mutuality of obligation and benefit.”166
But third, the 1934 Act was only a prelude to the Social Security Act
of 1935. The Supreme Court continued to strike down New Deal laws until
on November 3, 1936, Roosevelt won reelection with 60.8% of the vote,
carrying every state except Maine and Vermont. With Democrats prepared
to pack the Court with new judges,167 Justice Roberts switched to support
the New Deal.168 In Helvering v. Davis, a shareholder of Edison Electric
Illuminating Co. brought a derivative claim to injunct the company from
paying contributions under the Social Security Act, saying it exceeded the
Federal government’s power.169 Justice Benjamin Cardozo, now with a
majority, explained that it was lawful for Congress to spend money for
“general welfare,” and Congress had broad discretion to determine what
that meant.
Beyond the minimum provision of social security, how did workers
get fair pensions? With more collective bargaining, more employers
introduced workplace pensions, but many limited pensions to top officials
while claiming the payments were tax deductible because it was for “some

164. Epstein, supra note 110, at 107–11; cf. DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT:
AN AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 1800–1990, at 107–11 (1998). To paraphrase Justice Brandeis,
it turned out that during the economic crisis many a “courageous state” were keen to “serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
165. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
166. Id. at 357 (The government argued that it fulfilled the requirements of due process because
pensions promoted efficiency due to their ability to improve morale and create loyalty to the company.
The reply was apparently that the removal of the voluntary character of pensions necessarily “will
eliminate all sense of loyalty and gratitude to the employer.”).
167. President Roosevelt’s Bill to Reorganize the Judicial Branch of the Government was known
as the “court packing plan.” S. 1392, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R. 4417, 75th Cong. (1937).
168. This succeeded first with the approval of Washington’s minimum wage legislation in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The NLRA of 1935 was approved in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
169. See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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or all employees.”170 From the Stabilization Act of 1942 and Revenue Act
of 1942, tax exemptions could only be given if 70% of permanent
employees were covered by a plan. During the war, wage restraints had
been imposed, but pensions were exempt.171 Unions asked for pension
contributions, instead of wage rises, through collective agreements.172 In
Helvering, Justice Cardozo recorded that 75% people over 65 had been
wholly or partly dependent on others in old age.173 Social security ended
extreme dependence. Collective bargaining meant private sector pension
coverage rose from 15% in 1940 to over 40% by 1960.174 And initially,
unions bargained for plans where they controlled the contributions
completely.
As World War Two drew to a close, American society had been
transformed: it now had a modern system of social security, and
meaningful labor rights were building a thriving middle class. People had
enough money to save for retirement, and unions sought to manage
workers’ capital. Income inequality was decreasing as never before.

170. See Randolph E. Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 41,
77 (1937); George T. Altman, Pension Trusts for Key Men, TAX MAG., June 1937, at 324.
171. See Stabilization Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-729, § 10, 56 Stat. 765, 768 (repealed 1956);
Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 165(a), 56 Stat. 798, 862–63 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 401(a)) (allowing exclusion for temporary, seasonal or under-five-year workers, and
prohibiting discrimination in favor of executives, except insofar as benefits could be proportional to
pay); Arthur H. Kent, The Revenue Act of 1942, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1943); Leon L. Rice Jr.,
Employee Trusts under the Revenue Act of 1942, TAX MAG., Dec. 1942, at 721.
172. See generally Editor, Legal Status of Private Industrial Plans, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1375
(1940).
173. MARJORIE SHEARON ET AL., ECONOMIC INSECURITY IN OLD AGE: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OLD-AGE DEPENDENCY 15 (1937).
174. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & STEVEN A. SASS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE STOCK MARKET:
HOW THE PURSUIT OF MARKET MAGIC SHAPES THE SYSTEM 32 (2006) (depicting a graph showing a
high of 47% in 1982 and declining to an unsteady level around 43% by 2004).
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Figure 2

Labor rights and social security were central to what Roosevelt called
in 1944 a “Second Bill of Rights,” designed to achieve “new goals of
human happiness and well-being.”175 But there was one notable absence:
there was no settled view yet on the constitution of economic relations.
Collective bargaining strength was growing, but who appointed the
company boards unions bargained with? Pensions funds were building, but
who would control the assets? Sham company unions were banned, but
what could a legitimate work council look like? Ironically, in 1946 in
occupied Germany, the United States Military Government passed Control
Council Law No. 22, which set out a model work council that unions could
bargain for.176 German workers and unions had the right to establish work
councils with rights to enforce collective agreements, investigate
grievances, participate in setting up social insurance and social welfare,
and collectively agree on any further functions for work councils, reserved
from management prerogative.177 The United States helped win the war
for peace, democracy, and social justice abroad, but it was not yet there at
home.
175. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, arts. 20–26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
176. Control Council Law No. 22 Works Councils, Apr. 10, 1946, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 1945–1946, at 133–36 (1946), LSE Archives 43 (R498).
177. Id. arts. IV–V.
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C. Democracy in America, Almost: 1946 to 1980
Labor’s position after World War Two was one of unprecedented
strength, yet it was vulnerable. In the period up to 1980, labor became
increasingly aware of, and organized to use, its power in pension savings
to democratize corporate governance. This culminated in an astonishing,
concerted effort to win representation on company boards of directors. At
the same time, the interests behind corporate boardrooms and Wall Street
consolidated their opposition and used every instrument of the state—the
legislature, executive, and courts—to halt labor’s advance.
By 1946, union density had climbed to 35.5% of non-agricultural
workers, and labor was determined to secure an increase in wages. Unions
went on strike: one of the largest waves in American history.178 Employers
accused unions of having an “unfair” advantage by using pensions to pay
strikers. They argued employers should have no duty to bargain over
pensions at all,179 and shareholders brought derivative actions arguing any
payments to union pensions were ultra vires.180 In Congress, Senator
Robert Taft proposed a prohibition on employees’ involvement in
pensions.181 This mirrored the position of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
that “the primary responsibility for . . . old age must rest with the
individual.”182 He singled out the United Mine Workers pension fund,183
where the union leader, John Lewis, demanded a solely union
administered fund from the government.184 The miners’ dispute itself was
resolved by the federal government getting an agreement to jointly
administer the fund.

178. See JACK METZGAR, The 1945–1946 Strike Wave, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRIKES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 216–25 (A. Brenner et al. eds., 2009) (explaining the standard demand became
an 18.5% pay raise).
179. Inland Steel Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (holding that
pensions were a mandatory subject of collective bargaining), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
180. F. Hodge O’Neal, Stockholder Attacks on Corporate Pension Systems, 2 VAND. L. REV.
351 (1949).
181. 93 CONG. REC. 4892 (1947); see also H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 29–30 (1947), reprinted in
1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 309
(1948); House Set to Compromise on Labor Bill in Order to Obtain Measure on Which Veto Could Be
Beaten, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1947, at 3.
182. Conference on Emp. Pension Plans, Conference Minutes (July 9–10, 1947) (unpublished
minutes) (on file with USCOC Collection, Series 3, Box 6, Employee Pension Plans folder).
183. R Blodgett, Union Pension Fund Asset Management, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET 320, 321
(1980).
184. Louis Stark, New Strike Looms, Coal Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1947, at 5
(Quoting the hostile view of Forney Johnston of the National Coal Association, that the Union of Mine
Worker proposed funds “are now on the agenda of every central union in a program of sweeping
encroachment on the earnings and on the functions of ownership and management, with no limitation
whatever except the conscience of the union dynasty.”); see also United States v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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In the November 1946 election, Republicans won a majority in
Congress and the new Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act
1947 was passed to reduce labor power. It created an express right for
employers to proselytize against a union, created unfair labor practices for
unions, reinstated the prohibition on secondary action, and prohibited the
closed shop: unions could charge non-members fees for their services,
unless state laws stopped it.185 For pensions, its central change
was § 302(c)(5)(B). While it did not affect union pension funds that were
already established,186 employers could pay no money into a new union
fund unless the board was managed jointly, with a neutral umpire or a
court determining disputes in case of deadlock.187 While Carnegie’s TIAA
was designed with rights to minimum labor voice in pensions, Taft-Hartley
guaranteed a minimum voice for corporate boardrooms. President Harry
Truman vetoed the Act, but enough Democrats supported it that it became
law.
While the Taft-Hartley Act suppressed union governance of workers’
capital, more and more plans were collectively agreed to under the jointmanagement model, ironically named Taft-Hartley plans.188 By 1960, in
addition to single-employer pensions, Taft-Hartley multi-employer plans
covered 3.3 million workers,189 rising to 9.7 million workers in 1988.190
As Taft had known well,191 this money could be invested in shares.
Employers were keen to preempt union control if they could. In 1950, in
the so-called “Treaty of Detroit,”192 which was flaunted as a victory for
both sides, General Motors initiated a sole-employer pension as part of a
five year collective agreement.193 Managers were instructed to be inactive
in corporate governance, and the treaty confined investment to a maximum

185. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2012).
186. Gerald P. Cunningham, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and Union
Influence in Pension Fund Investment Decisions, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 151, 153 (1983).
187. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2012).
188. Robert Cook, The Case for Joint Trusteeship of Pension Plans, 6 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 26
(2002).
189. H. ROBERT BARTELL & ELIZABETH T. SIMPSON, PENSION FUNDS OF MULTIEMPLOYER
INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, UNIONS, AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 105 (1968).
190. 135 CONG. REC. 5984–6005, 6233 (1989) (citing a study by the ME Segal consulting firm).
191. JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POLITICS
AND POWER IN THE 1980S, at 101 (1978) (“Senator Claude Pepper of Florida . . . suggest[ed] that Taft
and his business friends, when they fretted over possible union abuses of the funds, were really fretting
over the possibility that they might lose control of the potential pool of capital that pension funds
represented. Pepper was right, but despite the fact, or probably because of it, the vote went against
labor.”).
192. Daniel Bell, The Treaty of Detroit, FORTUNE, July 1950, at 53.
193. Fredrick H. Harbison, The General Motors–United Auto Workers Agreement of 1950, 58 J.
POL. ECON. 397 (1950).
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of 0.75% in any company’s stock.194 By contrast, in 1952 the AFL-CIO
released a ten-point bargaining agenda that included joint-investment
boards.195 The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association was also
extended to buy into shares, with the College Retirement Equity Fund: this
made TIAA-CREF.196 These steps were still rare: only in 1967 was
California’s Public Employee Retirement Scheme, CalPERS, first able to
invest 25% of its assets in shares. Only in 1984 was the limit removed.197
The spirit of the 1950s was unfavorable to labor. Along with Senator
McCarthy’s “investigations” aiming to conflate unions with Soviet
dictatorship, a fund manager named Louis Kelso was popularizing stock
ownership, especially among employees, as the only way to have voice in
the economy.198 His motivation, which caught Republican attention, was
to ward off socialism by making all workers small capitalists without any
toleration of collective voice.199 This was not Carnegie’s pre-TIAA
worker-shareholder vision, nor was there any goal to ensure worker voice.
Kelso believed in the right to manage. Even on the Democratic side of
politics, Robert F. Kennedy’s search for the so-called “Enemy Within”
culminated in an ever-growing set of burdens on union governance in the
Landrum–Griffin Act of 1959.200 With states limiting unions under TaftHartley, even more than raw membership,201 union density faltered.

194. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO
AMERICA 7 (1976); PAUL HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 8 (1959).
195. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS 116 (1992).
196. GREENOUGH, supra note 97, at 360–62. In 1988, to register a new money market fund with
the SEC, TIAA-CREF risked losing charitable status, although it was previously exempt under 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Instead, CREF trustees were wholly elected by policyholders, according with the
Investment Company Act 1940 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–16 (2012).
197. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA, DEDICATION, VISION, HEART: THE CALPERS
STORY (2007).
198. KELSO & ADLER, supra note 14, at 202–04 (“Equity-sharing plans should not be built
around the concept of retirement . . . . [It should enable] the worker gradually to shift, over the period
of his employment, from absolute dependence on toil as the source of his income to dependence, in a
substantial degree, on his ownership of a capital interest.”).
199. LOUIS KELSO & PATRICA HETTER, HOW TO TURN EIGHTY MILLION WORKERS INTO
CAPITALISTS ON BORROWED MONEY (1967).
200. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2012); see
Ewan McGaughey, Democracy or Oligarchy? Models of Union Governance in the UK, Germany and
US 36–38 (King’s Coll. London Law Sch., Research Paper No. 2017-35, 2017).
201. N.B. The United States is unique compared to other countries in that it is experiencing
sustained, rapid population growth. There were 76 million people in 1900, 123 million by 1930, 151
million by 1950, 203 million by 1970, 248 million by 1990, and over 328 million today.
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Figure 3

Nevertheless, by the 1960s labor rights were strong enough to create
“a rising tide” that “lifts all boats.”202 In 1965, A.A. Berle believed a
peaceful “revolution” was still in motion, as the old forces of private
property were infused with a constitution of economic and social rights.
Workers saving for pensions, encouraged by tax reform, meant a growing
stake for everyone in economic growth.203 In 1968, Paul Blumberg went
further, arguing in Industrial Democracy: the Sociology of Participation
for the economic and scientific case to expand voice at work.204 He argued
that in the leading management case study, the Hawthorne experiments of
Elton Mayo, the data showed productivity rose when workers were given
genuine control over their working patterns, were no longer subjected to
authoritarian managers, and were treated with dignity.205 This became
known as the “participation hypothesis,” meaning that “significant
changes in human behavior can be brought about rapidly only if the

202. TED SORENSON, COUNSELOR: A LIFE AT THE EDGE OF HISTORY 227 (2008) (John F.
Kennedy’s speechwriter attributes the phrase to the regional chamber of commerce, the New England
Council.).
203. Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1965).
204. PAUL BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION chs. 2–
3 (1968).
205. Compare id. at 25, with ELTON MAYO, TEAMWORK AND LABOR TURNOVER IN THE
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1944).
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persons who are expected to change participate in deciding what the
change shall be and how it shall be made.”206
The benefits of labor participation were not completely ignored in
government. While sham company unions were unlawful, there had been
real success with “Scanlon plans” developed in 1938 by Ohio union leader
Joseph Scanlon: workers made suggestions for production and
administration in return for guaranteed bonuses if suggestions worked.207
The President’s National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality
in 1972 sought to promote productivity, including drawing on joint union–
management committees.208 Some unions were wary of participation
either with or in management,209 a view that some managerial interests
appeared keen to encourage. But many workers and unions were not shy
because they could see the right to select directors operating effectively in
other countries.210
The early 1970s unlocked a wave of experiments for workers on
boards, both through collective bargaining and voice in shares. In 1971,
the first proxy proposal was made at the General Motors annual meeting
for employee representation, followed by similar proposals the following
year at Ford, and the Illinois retailer Jewel.211 Also in 1972, the pilots of
United Airlines used the shares they held collectively to propose board
representation at the 1972 stockholder meeting. They won 5% of the
vote.212 At AT&T, shareholders proposed employees be included on the
board to “provide a continuing flow of information to management” and
“avoid periodic labor disruptions which place financial hardships on
206. H.A. Simon, Recent Advances in Organization Theory, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 23, 28–29 (1955).
207. ROBERT J. KÜHNE, CO-DETERMINATION IN BUSINESS: WORKERS’ REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE BOARDROOM 113–14 (1980) (By 1945, around 3,200 companies had joint production
committees, but in 1948 most had ended. Interest revived haphazardly afterward.). See generally
Gilbert K. Krulee, The Scanlon Plan: Co-Operation Through Participation, 28 J. BUS. 100 (1955).
208. E.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON PRODUCTIVITY, ANNUAL REPORT NO. 1, at 17 (1972) (United
Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO, in its 1971 collective agreement, required “joint union-industry
committees on productivity at the plant level.”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON PRODUCTIVITY, ANNUAL
REPORT NO. 4, at 21 (1975) (making clear these “committees are not a substitute for nor an alternative
to collective bargaining”).
209. Robert Dahl, Power to the Workers?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 19, 1970, at 9 (“[M]any
employees of a particular firm might not wish to participate in governing . . . workers and trade unions
may be the greatest barriers at present to any profound reconstruction of economic enterprise in this
country . . . . Along with the officialdom of the trade union movement, workers are deeply ingrained
with the old private property view of economic enterprise . . . affluent workers . . . tend to be
consumption-oriented, acquisitive, privatistic, and family-centered.”).
210. E.g., McGaughey, supra note 16.
211. Phillip I. Blumberg et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Panel: The Constituencies of the
Corporation and the Role of the Institutional Investors, 28 BUS. LAW. 177, 179 (1973).
212. Brian Hamer, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 640 (1981).
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employees and impose losses on the company and shareowners.”213 In
1973, workers at the small Providence and Worcester Railroad succeeded
in getting representation by collective bargaining, which the Wall Street
Journal described as a “precedent shattering labor agreement.”214 The
United Rubber Workers also proposed to the General Tire and Rubber
Company that a union member be appointed to the board, but they were
turned down.215
These developments in worker representation plainly troubled the
Nixon administration. In 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
using its power to regulate shareholders soliciting support for proposals,216
issued a letter to AT&T that management could exclude proposals for
worker directors to be placed on boards.217 This was ostensibly because
New York law, where AT&T was incorporated, gave the right to elect
directors to shareholders. It ignored that a simple bylaw amendment could
create classes of shareholders, or shareholders could agree to use their
votes to guarantee worker representatives. It was far from clear that
agreement upon shutting down experiment was widespread: the
Republican Senator for New York, Jacob K. Javits, said that “an effort to
open up corporate board room opportunities to workers would improve
workers’ understanding of management as well as exposing management
to workers’ ideas.”218 Unions persisted. In 1976, the Teamsters union
proposed that two union representatives be appointed to the board of the
brewing giant, Anheuser-Busch.219 Similarly, the International Federation
of Professional and Technical Engineers proposed at AT&T’s annual
meeting that a union representative be put on the board, but the proposal
won just 3.3% of votes cast.
The SEC and management opposition played into uncertainty within
the labor movement. While many unions themselves were strongly in
favor of board representation, the AFL-CIO, at a time of considerable
pressure, was not. Thomas Donahue (who became Secretary-Treasurer
213. Jerry W. Markham, Restrictions on Shared Decision-Making Authority in American
Business, 11 CAL. W. L. REV. 217, 245–46 (1975).
214. Davison Douglas, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 92 YALE
L.J. 106, 106 n.1 (1982).
215. Union Asks Seat on Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1973, at 31.
216. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78l (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.148(c)(l) (1970) (A company can omit to consider a proposal if “the proposal as submitted is, under the
law of the issuer’s domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders.”).
217. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,658 (1974). In
1974, there were 363 work days lost per 1,000 workers to strikes in the United States, but only 3 per
1,000 workers in Germany. Bennet Abramowitz, Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in
Corporate Governance, 34 SW. L.J. 963, 984 (1980).
218. KÜHNE, supra note 207, at 105.
219. Lassus, What the Teamsters Really Wanted, BEVERAGE WORLD, June 1976, at 34 (cited by
Douglas, supra note 213, at 106 n.1).
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from 1979 to 1995, and briefly President) said in 1976 that because
“American unions have won equality at the bargaining table, we have not
sought it in corporate boardrooms.” He did not want to be “the junior
partner in success and the senior partner in failure” or “blur the distinction
between management and labor.”220
But unions that bargained directly with management pressed on. In
1976, the United Auto Workers (UAW) declared that they sought
representation on the board of Chrysler. The proposal was rejected,221 but
then in 1979, as Chrysler drifted into severe financial problems, the board
conceded, and a worker director stepped on board.222 Chrysler denied “that
it intended to establish any principle of labor representation.” But Douglas
Fraser, UAW President and the new director, said this was “nonsense” and
just “to protect their flanks.”223 As Fraser declared before his election by
shareholders, arranged by the board, “it isn’t enough for a union to argue
about plant closings or layoffs after the decision has been made.”224
How did corporate boardrooms and Wall Street react to labor’s
growing assertiveness? First, in 1971, Lewis Powell wrote a memo for the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce urging concerted action in public education,
journalism, and for the courts to stop the “[a]ttack on [the] American Free
Enterprise System.”225 He urged business to “press vigorously in all
political arenas for support of the enterprise system,” learning lessons
“from organized labor in this respect” because the “American business
executive,” Powell lamented, “is truly the ‘forgotten man.’” It was true
that in 1969 the Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(h) was
amended, virtually unnoticed, to enable directors to set their own pay.226
Before this, the standard rule was that pay was set in bylaws or by
shareholder vote. This triggered an exponential curve in the chart below,
Figure 4. But far more profound and damaging in the long-term was
Nixon’s placement of Powell on the Supreme Court. In the first case after
Justice William O. Douglas left the bench, Buckley v. Valeo, it was
220. Eileen Appelbaum & Larry W. Hunter, Union Participation in Strategic Decisions of
Corporations 267 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9,590, 2003).
221. Craig R. Whitney, Auto Union Seeks Directors’ Seats, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1976, at 51;
cf. JOHN FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM (1977).
222. John D. Blackburn, Worker Participation on Corporate Directorates: Is America Ready for
Industrial Democracy?, 18 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 352 (1981).
223. UAW’s Fraser to Speak Out for Labor, Public, in Role as Director of Chrysler, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6.
224. WALL ST. J., May 14, 1980, at 6.
225. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell Jr. to Eugene B. Syndor Jr., Chairman of the Educ.
Comm. of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23,
1971).
226. S. Samuel Arsht & William K. Stapleton, Delaware General Corporation Law:
1969, 25 BUS. LAW. 287 (1969).
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decided, over powerful dissent, that candidates for political office could
spend unlimited amounts of money in election campaigns: it was
“unconstitutional” under the First Amendment to try and stop them.227
This was soon followed by First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, where
Justice Powell held that state legislation could not restrict expenditure by
corporations during a ballot.228 This must be seen as the start of an
exponential rise in inequality, as the American social and political system
was ground to a halt by money.
Figure 4

227. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In this case, the Supreme Court struck down parts of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. In his dissent, Justice White explained,
Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have corruptive potential;
but the Court strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to
what may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress
that passed this bill and the President who signed it . . . . Without limits on total
expenditures, campaign costs will inevitably and endlessly escalate . . . . By limiting the
importance of personal wealth, [§] 608(a) helps to assure that only individuals with a
modicum of support from others will be viable candidates. This in turn would tend to
discourage any notion that the outcome of elections is primarily a function of money.
Id. at 261–66 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. First Nat’l Bank Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Justice White wrote,
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of furthering certain
economic goals . . . the special status of corporations has placed them in a position to
control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only
the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process.
Id. at 809 (White, Brennan, and Marshal, JJ., dissenting); see also J. Skelly Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1982).
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Second, the structure of capital was gradually changed. In 1965, a
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds had recommended federal rights
against pensions being withdrawn by employers, so that they “vested,” and
standards for funding.229 In 1972, the NBC documentary Pensions: The
Broken Promise publicized the extent of the problems.230 If workers
moved jobs, they had no right to take their pensions with them. Employers
might also promise a pension but set aside no money. This led to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, requiring
that money vested after one year’s work, and that defined benefit (DB)
schemes had minimum funding, guaranteed by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation.231
Positive though ERISA was, it also influenced governance choices.
A plan had to be in a written instrument, and assets had to be held by
trustees which could include a company’s own officers or employees,
despite the possible conflicts of interest.232 Moreover, ERISA § 402(d)(1)
created immunity for trustees in negligence cases (including duties to
diversify) if they outsourced or “delegated” to an external manager,
and § 404(c)(1) created immunity for the employer (the plan “sponsor”) if
beneficiaries exercised any minimal control over the plan’s assets. At the
time, only a handful of public pensions—for California,233 Connecticut,
and Nebraska state employees, as well as Ohio teachers—enabled pension

229. President’s Comm. on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Ret. and Welfare
Programs, Public Policy and Private Pension Programs (1965); see Arthur C. O’Meara, Public Policy
and Private Pension Programs, 21 BUS. LAW. 971 (1966); cf. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE &
FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (2d Sess. 1966).
230. PENSIONS: THE BROKEN PROMISE (NBC News 1972). The documentary won a Peabody
Award and sufficiently outraged the Richard Nixon government and lead the Nixon administration to
bring an action, through the Federal Communications Commission, for breaching the then “fairness
doctrine” that programming had to be duly impartial. After the Nixon-controlled FCC found that NBC
was in breach, the Federal Court of Appeals overturned the ruling to find no breach in Nat’l Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The fairness doctrine was later abolished by the Reagan
administration, so that broadcasting does not need to give any semblance of fairness, due impartiality,
or accuracy. Equivalent laws persist for all television in the United Kingdom under the
Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 319 (Eng.), and in Germany, see Rundfunkstaatsvertrag [RSTV]
[Interstate Broadcasting Agreement], July 31, 1991, § 11. Internet regulation has not yet caught up.
231. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081–1102 (1980).
232. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 402(a), 403(a), 408(c)(3), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1102(a), 1103(a), 1108(c)(3) (2012) [hereinafter ERISA]; see Mark J. Roe, The Modern
Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 75, 91 (1993) (“[C]onflicts that benefit
managers are tolerated.”).
233. See Castaneda, supra note 197 (Section 20100-3 of the California Government Code
(1991), now found in § 20090 (2011), requires seven members appointed by the employer (i.e., the
government), but six elected by beneficiaries, from 2010.).
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beneficiaries to elect their trustees.234 ERISA did nothing to empower the
ultimate investors of capital: it encouraged the reverse.
The incentives for pension trustees and employers to outsource
pension management enabled asset managers to take shareholder voting
rights on other people’s money. Tax incentives drove this further. First,
the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 originally
allowed self-employed workers to establish tax deferred saving accounts,
called Keogh plans. Second, ERISA extended this right to defer tax to a
maximum of $2,000 a year in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) to
everyone, including workers who already had employer, union,
government or Keogh pensions plans. IRAs were often held by banks. Tax
exemptions were created for employers who put worker retirement money
or savings into stock ownership schemes.235 Third, people still wanted to
put more funds in tax-deferred accounts, so the Internal Revenue Code of
1978 § 401(k) was introduced. Employers found these “401(k)” plans
convenient. They could send off their staff details and fund “choices” to
be organized by an investment manager.236 If the fund’s management was
outsourced, trustees had no liability. If beneficiaries had some choice of
plan, employers had no liability.
This series of changes (the incentives to outsource investment
management and the easy option of IRAs) laid the groundwork for an
assault on workers’ pensions in the 1980s. In 1976, the management
theorist Peter Drucker argued that because workers’ pensions made up
25% of equity capital, and “by 1985 (probably sooner), they will own at
least 50—if not 60 per cent—of equity capital.”237 But the stark reality was
that workers lacked any meaningful voice over their money. As Rifkin and
Barber argued in 1978, banks and asset managers exercised “direct
control” and “have sole voting rights for the stock they purchase with
pension-fund assets.”238 For example, Chase Manhattan managed a $423
million pension for the tire company Firestone while at the same time the
bank trust held 950,000 shares in Firestone.239 Also, the former Chase
president sat on Firestone’s board. Rifkin and Barber hoped that an
upcoming case, Daniel v. Teamsters, might see the Supreme Court
234. Louis M. Kohlmeier, State and Local Pension Fund Asset Management, in ABUSE ON
WALL STREET, supra note 182, at 278 (1980). Ohio’s system of representation began in 1973. The
Wisconsin State Teachers Retirement System, unusually, had a wholly employee elected board,
although a separate State of Wisconsin Investment Board managed investments, and were appointed.
235. ERISA § 407(d)(6); 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7).
236. Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate
for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 876 (2009).
237. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO
AMERICA 1 (1976).
238. RIFKIN & BARBER, supra note 191, at 114.
239. Id. at 116.
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approve the view that every beneficiary had “the right to exercise control
over some $400 billion in pension assets.”240 Perhaps not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court did not oblige.241
Third, it was clear that a number of business leaders, however
irrationally, viewed workers on boards “with horror.”242 In 1976, Michael
Jensen and Bill Meckling gave that horror a theoretical framework by
arguing that efficient enterprise came about through the reduction of
“agency costs” in the “nexus of contracts” that made up a corporation.243
The idea that a corporation was a bundle of contracts was not new.244
Emboldened by its absence of empirical foundation, the theory’s critical
feature was a total rejection of bargaining power as a relevant factor in
explaining who got voice in corporate governance. In 1979, Jensen and
Meckling warned that if workers entered board rooms, or legislation was
introduced like in West Germany, the economy would grind to a halt as it
had in Marshall Tito’s Yugoslavia.245 This echoed the Business
Roundtable’s view: workers on boards were “inconsistent with U.S.
traditions and style of management-labor relationships at arm’s length.”
The notion that workers might have any vote in corporate governance was
rejected.246
D. Ownership Society, Enron Economy: 1980 to 2018
In many ways, the evolution of labor’s voice in corporate governance
since 1980 played out the consequences of Buckley v. Valeo: labor law
“ossified” and asset managers, not the real investors of capital, took over
votes in the economy because the capacity for progressive legislation was

240. Id. at 135.
241. Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1241–42 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Because
employee pension plans are now the major, if not sole, form of investment for most American workers
to provide for their old age and because of the now crucial role that such plans play in today’s capital
markets, they are just the sort of investment vehicle that the securities acts were passed to regulate.”),
rev’d, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
242. Richard M. Steuer, Employee Representation on the Board: Industrial Democracy or
Interlocking Directorate, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 255, 255 (1977).
243. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
244. Friedrich Kessler, Wirtschaftsführertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht, 83 U. PA.
L. REV. 393 (1935) (reviewing Johannes Zahn’s book the German Aktiengesetz 1937); see Ewan
McGaughey, Ideals of the Corporation and the Nexus of Contracts, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1057 (2015).
245. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 468, 469–506 (1979).
246. Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2107 (1978). The term “arms length” is probably
a reference to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939),
which defined a director’s fiduciary duties as requiring arm’s length negotiation.
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shut down by money.247 Upon his victory as President, one of Ronald
Reagan’s first acts was to dismiss members of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization who were attempting to bargain for a three-day
weekend.248 After this, the National Labor Relations Board was restaffed
by people opposed to collective bargaining, while Supreme Court
jurisprudence ground the remainder of union rights down further.249
Nevertheless, labor’s vote in corporate governance persisted.
Douglas Fraser of the UAW served on the board of Chrysler from 1980 to
1984, treading a fine line between rescuing the company and recusing
himself from negotiating collective agreements.250 In 1981, the UAW also
proposed a labor representative on the American Motors Corporation
board. The employers accepted UAW’s proposal contingent on the
government’s approval. The Federal Trade Commission viewed this
proposal as lawful. But the Department of Justice argued the Clayton Act
of 1914 § 8, which prohibits interlocking directorates, was engaged if
unions appointed board members to competing companies. It failed to
provide credible evidence that there were any anti-competitive effects
under similar European systems251 or that there was any way to recognize
that local union appointees or direct elections by employees would present
any problem.252 While the UAW did not press the issue, in 1982 Pan
247. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564 (2014) (finding that legislation bears virtually no
relation to people’s preferences since 1981).
248. John M. Keynes, Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren (1930), in ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 358, 358–73 (1932).
249. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (held
5 to 4 that unions could not collect fees from non-member workers who benefit from collective agreements); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (held 5 to 4 that an employer can bind
workers to submit to arbitration, with “arbitrators” chosen by employers to “decide” even statutory
rights); Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (held 5 to 4 that NLRA of 1935
removed protection for undocumented workers to the fundamental right to organize a union); Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (held 5 to 4 that ERISA enabled employees to be denied the
right to claim medical malpractice, when employers were the direct purchaser of a health care plan);
Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984) (held 5 to 4
on the NLRA of 1935 allowed states to ban union representatives who were not of “good moral character”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (held 5 to 4 that the Fourth Amendment allowed
employees to be searched at work like criminal suspects); see, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672 (1980) (held 5 to 4 that professors with nominal “management” input were deprived of the fundamental human right to collective bargaining).
250. See Douglas A. Fraser, Worker Participation in Corporate Government: The U.A.W.–
Chrysler Experience, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 949 (1982); cf. Ronald M. Sharp, Codetermination: A
Postmortem, 40 LAB. L.J. 323, 331–32 (1989).
251. For examples today, the Swedish Board Representation (Private Sector Employees) Act
1987 (SFS 1987:1245) § 6 empowers unions to appoint board members. The German Codetermination
Act 1976 §§ 9 and 18 enable unions to cast votes by default in companies with over 8,000 workers,
but workers always have the right to opt out.
252. Cf. Davidson Douglas, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 92 YALE
L.J. 106, 117–25, (1982) (presenting a two-fold exemption test that (1) a representative should not be
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American Airways elected a union member to serve on its board.253 In
1984, the new UAW President, Owen Bieber, took up Fraser’s board seat
at Chrysler.254 The Pan American arrangement was ended by the board in
1991, but then revived in 1998 when the next UAW President, Stephen
Yokich, joined255 during the merger with German corporation DaimlerBenz.256 In 1993, the United Steel Workers agreed to representation on
five company boards for six years,257 and the USW leader, Lynn Williams,
pushed for more whenever the opportunity arose.258 Compared to other
OECD countries, these experiments alone mean the United States
achieved one of the strongest traditions of codetermination. It was a
remarkable feat in the face of the full force of the administrative state and
the hostility of a Supreme Court, Department of Labor, Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Department of Justice dominated by business
interests.
Many board representation plans were entangled with share schemes,
were without meaningful voice,259 and came with unacceptable risk. In a
sample from 1998, Larry Hunter found that among 25 firms, all linked to
share schemes, there was no majority of workers on a board.260 In 1999,
Robert McKersie recorded there were around 35 major representation
plans in total.261 Critically, share schemes were exempted from ERISA’s

a national union appointee, or (2) a full time official). It is notable that, unlike the serious issues with
mutual funds discussed below, evidence of anti-competitive effects in European countries with
codetermination laws and union appointees does not appear to exist.
253. WALL ST. J., May 13, 1982, at 22.
254. Doron P. Levin, Chrysler to Cut Board; U.A.W. Chief Is Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991,
at 1.
255. JOHN W. BUDD & JAMES G. SCOVILLE, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 270 (2005).
256. The corporation became Chrysler LLC in 2007, after being sold to Cerberus Capital
Management. It went bankrupt in 2009: workers got board seats again, but it became a Fiat SpA
subsidiary in 2014, now Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV.
257. The Unions Step on Board, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1993.
258. Bruce E. Kaufman, An Interview with Steelworkers’ President Lynn Williams, 22 J. LAB.
RES. 145, 164–45 (2001).
259. Cf. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-87-8, EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK
OWNSERHIP 41–43 (1986) (In a survey of 3,000 ESOPs, around 15% carried an employee involvement
in decision-making.).
260. Larry W. Hunter, Can Strategic Participation be Institutionalized? Union Representation
on American Corporate Boards, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 557, 557–78 (1998); see also Elieen
Appelbaum & Larry W. Hunter, Union Participation in Strategic Decisions of Corporations, in
EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 265, 282 tbl.8.1
(Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005) (showing a list of companies with union-nominated directors).
261. Robert B. McKersie, Union Nominated Directors: A New Voice in Corporate Governance,
in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE: FROM THE WORKPLACE TO SOCIETY 223 (Thomas A. Kochan &
David B. Lipsky eds., 2003).
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requirements for prudent investment and diversification.262 These
consequences were on display when the energy company, Enron,
collapsed in December 2001. Enron’s 20,000 employees had been
encouraged,263 and partly required,264 to invest an average of 62.5% of
their retirement savings in 401(k) plans in Enron itself. For this, the
workforce had no board representation. Enron workers were not alone.
One study found that employees invested an average of 29.6% of their
pension savings in their employer. Procter & Gamble’s employees had
94.7% invested, Coca-Cola’s employees had 81.5%, and General
Electric’s employees had 77.4%.265 Again, employees had no
representation and were “horrifically underdiversified.”266 The Enron
economy, which sold ownership without power, was given an even bigger
name by President George W. Bush in 2005: the “ownership society.”267
The Enron economy, the ownership society, meant boardrooms, asset
managers, and banks held onto economic privilege with other people’s
labor and other people’s money.
It was easy to be cynical about labor’s voice in corporate governance.
In 1987, President Carter’s former Labor Secretary, John Dunlop, said it
was “damned insignificant and won’t spread[,] . . . codetermination is not
about to sweep industrial relations in this country.”268 Dunlop was also not
planning to help. When President Clinton was elected, he appointed
Dunlop to head a Commission on the Future of Worker–Management
Relations.269 It recommended a unified definition of an “employee” to
receive labor rights, as well as minor reforms to collective bargaining. It
said nothing about board participation, though it did stoke debate about
work councils. In 1992, the National Labor Relations Board decided that
262. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 110469(a)(1)(C), requires diversification, but under
(a)(2) this “is not violated by acquisition or holding qualifying employer securities” as defined under
§407(d).
263. David Millon, Worker Ownership through 401(k) Retirement Plans: Enron’s Cautionary
Tale, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 835, 840 (2002) (“[I]n August 2001, CEO Ken Lay told employees, ‘Now
is the time to buy Enron shares’ and, in September, he reiterated that the stock was a great
bargain . . . . Lay himself sold shares worth twenty million dollars during the same period.”).
264. ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE JULY 1,
1999, § III.1, 4, V.16(a).
265. PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21115, THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY AND
EMPLOYER STOCK IN RETIREMENT PLANS 4 (2002).
266. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 640–41 (4th ed. 2006).
267. President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005) (“To give every
American a stake in the promise and future of our country, we will . . . build an ownership society.
We will widen the ownership of homes and businesses, retirement savings and health insurance—
preparing our people for the challenges of life in a free society.”).
268. Bureau of National Affairs, DAILY LAB. REP., Nov. 30, 1987.
269. U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MGMT. REL., DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT (1994).
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“action committees” at Electromation Inc. violated NLRA of
1935 § 8(a)(2).270 The committees heard complaints about pay or bonuses
and had a majority of employee representatives, but the employer
structured their proposals and paid the members.271 Dunlop said § 8(a)(2)
should be “clarified” by Congress, but did not say how or why with any
clarity.272 After the 1994 Congressional elections, Republicans proposed
the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, which proposed
to allow committees on any issue of “mutual interest” so long as they did
not claim to become exclusive bargaining representatives.273 This was
essentially a way, once more, to privatize labor voice, and reincarnate
company unions. In 1996, President Clinton was forced to veto the Bill,
though calls for § 8(a)(2) to be repealed or amended have persisted.274 The
same issue resurfaced in 2014 at the Chattanooga, Tennessee plant of
Volkswagen. At first, management suggested it wanted a “work council,”
though not clearly with autonomous rights that would ordinarily be found
abroad. This led to an unprecedented campaign by Republican lobbyists
and politicians to stop anything. Eventually, the UAW simply held a
recognition ballot, where 626 workers voted in favor but 712 voted
against. Instead, the UAW held and succeeded in a ballot for a segment of
the plant. Management refused to bargain.275
Without meaningful voice on boards and in work councils, and with
unions fighting hard, who held the votes in the American economy? In
1980, predictions were still widespread that labor’s capital would grow,
pensions or other collective funds could become democratic, and so would
economic governance. This was not to be. A broad variety of corporate,
trust, and contract pensions could be organized, either by collective
agreement or the employer.276 But increasingly, people’s savings were
pressed into individual accounts, dominated by mutual firms. In 1982, one
270. Electromation Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 142 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1993).
271. EI du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 143 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1993) (deciding
safety and health committees, because they were subject to a management veto, were an unlawful
usurpation of labor organization functions); see Dennis M. Devaney, Electromation and du Pont: The
Next Generation, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 14 (1994).
272. See U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MGMT. REL., supra note 268, at 22, 27,
30–31. See, therefore, the dissenting view of Douglas A. Fraser, id. at 32.
273. Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
274. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12
LAB. LAW. 117 (1996).
275. See Stephen J. Silvia, The United Auto Workers’ Attempts to Unionize Volkswagen
Chattanooga, 71 INDUS. L. REV. 600 (2018) (But note that the assessment at 605–06, suggesting it is
unlawful under § 8(a)(2) to establish a work council, cannot be regarded as entirely accurate if, as in
Germany, workers, not employers, take the initiative to set up work councils.).
276. See the excellent summary by Gerald P. Cunningham, The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 and Union Influence in Pension Fund Investment Decisions, 12 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 151 (1984).
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account of an election for four board vacancies at Prudential found the
only four candidates were nominated by the board:
Eligible to vote were 18.4 million policyholders. Of these, 323 did—
virtually all of them employees of Prudential. Later in the same year,
policyholders of the Equitable were called upon to choose among a
field of 11 nominees to fill 11 board seats. An estimated 3,250,000
policyholders were eligible to vote but were not informed of the
election; 6,400, mostly Equitable employees, voted by mail.277

Investment companies like Prudential or Equitable, increasingly
running 401(k) plans, would be set up by firms under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 without any real governance standards. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 16 required policyholders to vote for
the investment company board. But in practice, advisers selected the
investment company’s first board of directors and delegated the
investment work back to the advisers.278
This was the model the Reagan administration aggressively sought
to promote for labor’s capital. In 1983, the Internal Revenue Service ruled
that “surplus assets,” which could be taken by a company when it closed
down a pension scheme, meant anything in excess of current liabilities.279
In 1984, the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation issued termination guidelines for pension trusts.280 The
closure of defined benefit pension funds was colossal, peaking in 1985.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 placed a cap on tax deferment in IRAs,
encouraging the shift to mutual funds.281 The Single-Employer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1986 enabled easy terminations. “Between 1980
and 1989, firms terminated more than 2,000 pension plans and used $20
billion in ‘excess’ funds for their own purposes, leaving 1.6 million
individuals . . . 50 percent of what they would have received had their
plans remained intact.”282 Those who did not lose their pensions got risky
401(k) plans. In 1979, 401(k) assets were 2% of U.S. household assets,

277. ANDREW TOBIAS, INVISIBLE BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEVER
WANTED YOU TO KNOW 35–36 (1982) (“Seven showed up at the election to vote in person.”).
278. Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate
for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 849 (2009).
279. Internal Revenue Code § 1.401(b) permits “the employer to recover at the termination of
the trust . . . any balance which is due to erroneous actuarial computations during the life of the trust.”
Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87.
280. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, LABOR’S CAPITAL: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS 90–91 (1992).
281. Mutual Funds, Brokers Taking A Bigger Slice of the IRA Pie, AM. BANKER, Mar. 10, 1986.
282. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 280, at 97.
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3% in 1987, but rose to 21% by 2009.283 Share ownership was
transformed.284
Figure 5

The turning point was 1985: private pensions (in green) went into
decline, to be replaced in part by mutual fund firms (in yellow) selling
individual 401(k)s. The largest termination in 1986 was made by Exxon:
it took advantage of a tax-credit that was about to expire, seizing $1.6
billion of its workers’ pension money without paying corporate tax.285 The
major asset management firms, especially Vanguard, State Street, and the
new BlackRock, were on track to monopolize the priorities of corporate
governance, and all with “other people’s money.”
283. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK: A REVIEW OF
TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY (50th ed. 2010).
284. The sources for the charts are BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 2005–2010, at 85 tbl.L.223
(2011), and the updates in (2015) and (2018). Id. at 23 tbl.F.118, and 25 tbl.F.121 explain the concepts
used at 85 tbl.L.213. The “private pension” figures included both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans when they invested in shares, but only if it was managed independently or through
a custodial bank. If money was placed into an open-ended investment company—run by an asset
manager—it would show up under the mutual fund figures. The author has calculated percentages of
total assets from the raw data and merged the federal, state and local pensions as “public.” Various
smaller categories are excluded.
285. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 280, at 87.
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Employers were taking the votes on labor’s capital as well. In 1989,
a House of Representatives subcommittee on leveraged buyouts heard that
trustees of single-employer pension plans were investing in junk bonds
and terminating plans prematurely to make takeovers more attractive.286
Company directors used votes on employee pension money to defend
against takeovers of friendly colleagues on other boards287 or simply to
pursue pro-management policies.288 In 1989, Representative Peter
Visclosky proposed a new § 403(a)(2) in ERISA, so that for singleemployer plans elected labor representatives and unions would have half
the seats on pension boards.289 It was rejected. With similar provisions, the
Workplace Democracy Act of 1992, sponsored by Bernie Sanders, was
rejected, and so were its reintroductions up to 1999.290 A further bill,
sponsored again by Peter Visclosky entitled the Employees’ Pension
Security Act of 2005, repeated to 2009, met the same fate.291
Where labor was represented, pensions were increasingly organized
and active.292 In 1993, 45 of 50 state public pension funds had beneficiary
representatives, although most were still appointed rather than elected.293
The reputation of appointed members had been tarnished, as employers
used pensions to plug budget deficits by directing them to buy sub-prime
government bonds.294 This led to a concerted move to ensure actual
elections.295 By 1998, out of 2,670 public retirement systems, there was an

286. Oversight Hearings on the Role of Pension Funds in Corporate Takeovers Before the
Subcomm. on Labor–Mgmt. Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong. (1989).
287. WILLIAM M. O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND
POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING 182 (1992).
288. Roe, supra note 231, at 91–94.
289. Joint Trusteeship Act of 1989, H.R. 2664, 101st Cong. (1989).
290. Workplace Democracy Act of 1999, H.R. 1277, 106th Cong. (1999); see also H.R. 2012,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1355, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 5126, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 6041, 102d
Cong. (1992).
291. Employees’ Pension Security Act of 2009, H.R. 4281, 111th Cong (2009); see also H.R.
5754, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 4055, 109th Cong. (2005).
292. Marleen O’Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to
Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345 (1997); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S.
Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1018 (1998). N.B. The SEC and courts ended social responsibility amendments under
Rule 14a-8.
293. CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PUBLIC PENSION PLANS: THE STATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2d
ed. 1993).
294. See generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993), where the proposed solution was apparently to give
employees “more” control by transforming public pensions into defined contribution plans with
guaranteed insurance contracts to mimic defined benefit outcomes. It is difficult, however, to detect
how this alone would not simply place control in the hands of fund management families.
295. One aspect was the model Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems
Act of 1997 § 17(c)(3) suggesting pension plans disclose how its trustees were selected. See Steven L.
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average of 36% elected trustees, 15% ex officio trustees, and 44%
appointed trustees.296 Adverse opinion still lingered, with some arguing
that “public pension fund trustees lack significant financial incentives to
maximize fund performance.”297 But the better view was that the
increasingly “high activism of public pension funds” reflected “the way
owners would tend to act. They lack the managerial command structure
that private pensions have.”298 With size and motivation, public pensions
drove better governance standards.299 This made them political targets. In
2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger attempted to terminate the
Californian plans and resurrect them as a form of 401(k) operation, until
the plan was defeated by protests.300 He was simply following the
successful strategy of individualizing and outsourcing private pensions.
Although public or union pensions could be active, even acting
together they would still invariably be a minority among registered
stockholders in a company meeting: the others would typically be asset
managers and, before 2010, banks acting as brokers. For example, in 2006,
pensions campaigned against the reelection of Disney’s Michael Eisner
after he approved a $100 million golden parachute for the ex-CEO Michael
Ovitz. The motion to remove Eisner from office was, however, defeated
by broker banks, who cast votes for their retail shareholders: votes on other
people’s money.301 This led to calls for the NYSE to tighten Rule 452, and
it made a request to the SEC in 2006.302 The SEC finally condoned the

Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act,
51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 145 (1998).
296. David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence
on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 196 (2005).
297. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007). This referred to an old, slightly hostile article by Roberta
Romano, supra note 293.
298. Roe, supra note 231, at 91–92 (“The high activism of public pension plans—pensions run
for state employees—contrasts sharply with the relative passivity of private pensions. Public pensions
persistently propose charter amendments, prod managers, and establish lobbying groups. Some of their
actions may be political posturing, but I believe many are not. They are acting, roughly and
imprecisely, the way owners would tend to act. They lack the managerial command structure that
private pensions have.”).
299. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance (2010)
(requiring, for instance, under B6.1, removal of directors without cause and under A4, one share one
vote).
300. Jim Wasserman, CA: Governor Ousts CalSTRS Appointees Who Oppose His Pension Plan,
FREE REPUBLIC (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1340769/posts [https://
perma.cc/7LNM-PKCH].
301. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE 9 (June 5, 2006), http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/sites/default/files/NYSE%
20Proxy%20Working%20Grp%20Rpt%206-5-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6E8-E34C].
302. The background is summarized briefly by Elisse B. Walter, Regulating Broker–Dealers and
Investment Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization?, 35 J. CORP. L. 1 (2009).
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change in 2009,303 prohibiting brokers from voting on any election for
directors, whether contested or not, unless they were registered as advisers
under the Investment Company Act.304 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 957 then introduced a new
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(10). This prohibited brokers from
using other people’s shares to vote on anything that the Commission
determined to be “significant” without express instruction from their
customers,305 including director elections and executive pay.
Brokers could no longer vote, but asset managers still could, and the
concentration of power has been spectacular. Invariably asset managers
outsourced the actual casting of votes to proxy advisers,306 but they still
controlled voting policy. By 2017, the three largest mutual firms,
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, if they combined the shares they
held, would constitute the largest shareholder in 438 of the top 500 firms,
and the largest in 40% of all companies.307 The largest five shareholders
(mostly mutuals) owned an average 20.8% in the top-twenty
corporations.308 It has been found that mutual firms have already caused
rising consumer prices.309 This has been described as “the major new
antitrust challenge of our time.”310
Even more than damage to competition, it is clear that conflicts of
interest—by selling pension products to the firms in which they exercise
voting rights—have become systemic. In a dataset from 2003 to 2011, a
study found that the “presence of a fund with business ties can destroy up
to 41% of the value enhancement” that comes from shareholder
proposals.311 To maintain influence, mutual fund families significantly
overweight the stocks of companies where the family provides 401(k)
303. Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg.
33293, 3329395 (July 1, 2009).
304. Giving Proxies by Member Organization, New York Stock Exch., r. 452.11(19) (2018).
305. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 957,
124 Stat. 1376, 1906–07 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2018)).
306. See generally Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors:
Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010); Michael C. Schouten, Do Institutional Investors Follow
Proxy Advice Blindly (Jan. 4, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam).
307. Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, Proposal to Limit the AntiCompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L. J. 1, 2 (2017).
308. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 92 tbl.1 (2017).
309. Jose Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018).
310. Posner, Morton & Weyl, supra note 306, at 2. The authors’ proposal, despite the prescient
antitrust analysis, of limiting shareholdings to 1% would be highly damaging and disproportionate to
the problem. This essentially mirrors the General Motors “Treaty of Detroit” plan, supra at Part I.C.
311. Dragana Cvijanovic, Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos Zachariadis, Ties that Bind: How
Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism, 76 J. FIN. 2933 (2016).
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plans.312 For over four decades,313 mutual funds have been empowered to
engage in mass self-dealing, using shareholder votes to close collective
DB schemes, open 401(k) plans, and so inflate the fees they earn by giving
everyone an individual account: “smashing and scattering” pensions
wherever they go.314
Mutual firms do not only use their votes for mass self-dealing: they
crush proposals that do not match the political preferences of fund
managers. In 2009, Jennifer Taub found that “the greater the dependency
of the Adviser upon the [defined contribution] channel for asset
management business, the less likely the fund family will be to support
shareholder-sponsored governance resolutions.”315 Indeed, Vanguard,
BlackRock, and State Street have almost identical voting guidelines.316
Through sheer inertia they routinely opposed all attempts to restrain
spiraling executive pay, advance employment rights, control corporate
political donations, or stop climate damage.317 Mutual funds support
management 90% of the time, and spend almost nothing to do it: Vanguard
employed just fifteen people for engagement and voting in 13,000
companies, BlackRock twenty people for 14,000 companies, and State
Street under ten people for 9,000 companies.318 Less than fifty people
dominate and abuse the U.S. economy, all unelected.
II. THE MYTH OF SHAREHOLDER LEGITIMACY
The concentration of power in the modern economy has followed no
coherent historical or economic logic. Instead of arising through fair
competition, voting was shaped by legal suppression of labor’s voice,
compounded upon capital’s unequal bargaining power. Though the history
is clear, are there political justifications for asset managers monopolizing
the votes in the economy today?

312. Lauren Cohen & Breno Schmidt, Attracting Flows by Attracting Big Clients: Conflicts of
Interest and Mutual Fund Portfolio Choice (Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper No. 08-054, 2007).
313. Recall RIFKIN & BARBER, supra note 190, at 116 on Firestone and Chase, supra at Part I.C.
314. David Webber, The Real Reason the Investor Class Hates Pensions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/opinion/investor-class-pensions.html (full story told in
WEBBER, supra note 17, chs. 1, 7, 8).
315. Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate
for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 847 (2009).
316. Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 101,
124 (2018).
317. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 224–27 (2018) (showing
tables of resolutions and the voting record of support on political spending disclosure and carbon
emission disclosure).
318. Sarah Krouse, David Benoit & Tom McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers:
Passive Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporatepower-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101.
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Like Louis Kelso’s view that holding shares is the passport to
corporate citizenship,319 conventional wisdom in corporate governance, at
least in the United States,320 is dominated by an idea of legitimacy for
“shareholder primacy” because it is said shareholders bear the greatest
risks in bankruptcy. In 1979, Jensen and Meckling argued that because a
shareholder is (supposedly) “the residual claimant on the firm’s cash
flows”—or the party to be paid last upon a corporation’s bankruptcy—the
shareholder is the best monitor of the corporation. The “monitoring of
management will be far less efficiently performed” by workers because
they, said Jensen and Meckling, are not the “residual claimant.”321 In 1983,
Easterbrook and Fischel argued that shareholders monopolize votes
because “[v]oting flows with the residual interest in the firm” and, if laws
do anything else, “there will be a needless agency cost of management.”322
In 1984, Oliver Williamson suggested that shareholders make the only
“asset-specific” investments in corporations that cannot be protected
without monopolizing votes for the board of directors. While workers’
interests could apparently be protected through job security, the “capital is
always at hazard.”323
These theories have become major canons of corporate governance
for at least three decades, but rest on a premise that is evidently wrong:
shareholders usually bear no risk and make no firm-specific investments.
Asset managers control shareholder voting rights with other people’s
money.324 This is why theories of shareholder primacy were rejected by
Berle and Means, and from the New Deal to the 1970s.325 Sometimes, a
319. KELSO & ADLER, supra note 14, at 167.
320. Cf. Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance
and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 339 (2012); Thomas Raiser, The
Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1988). But
also in the United States, see Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational
Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015),
which holds up Oxford University—whose governance is dominated by its employees—as a central
example for good long-term governance.
321. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 244, at 485–86.
322. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. ECON. 395,
409 (1983). The authors also suggest that this is the reason that a one-share, one-vote norm prevails.
Basic historical understanding shows such a norm does not prevail in absence of regulation. See EWAN
MCGAUGHEY, PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ch. 5 (2014).
323. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 29 (1985); Oliver
E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
324. Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. 15, § 1 (1848), (making
the point that capital bears risk, but believed, at Book IV, ch. 7, § 4, “the relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually superseded by partnership, in one of two forms: in some cases, association of
the labourers with the capitalist; in others, and perhaps finally in all, association of labourers among
themselves”).
325. E.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 353–56 (arguing that corporations must serve, not
a self-enriching group of directors or shareholders, but “the paramount interests of the community”).

2019]

Democracy in America at Work

747

claim is added that multiple interest groups on boards will quarrel with one
another, leading to inefficient management.326 Shareholders, it is said,
should monopolize governance because they have a homogenous interest
in maximizing profits, while workers (ostensibly) have more
heterogeneous views.327 Even if interest-heterogeneity could be
measured,328 or the claim that multiple interest groups lead to inefficiency
were backed by empirical evidence,329 asset manager interests are
diametrically opposed to those of the true investors. With ownership
separated from control,330 asset managers profit from their office, charging
fees in markets they vote to rig, not from doing good work.331 Even if one
accepts the evidence-free theory that asset managers do bear risk, or share
interests with other shareholders, most people know the risk of losing a
job is more serious than the risk of losing money on one insolvent
company in a diversified share portfolio.332 Job-risk weighs more in
people’s lives than capital-risk. The monopolization of shareholder votes
by asset managers is not a system that emerged in a competitive
environment,333 but one backed by the coercive power of federal law and
the unequal bargaining power of captured capital.
But would shareholder monopolization be more legitimate if the true
investors of capital, not asset managers, alone held all voting rights? This
326. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 111–12 (1996) (“[T]he board is not
used for making the particular types of decisions where workers and shareholders have the most
strongly conflicting interests, and where the workers have the most strongly conflicting interests
among themselves.”); accord JOHANNES C. D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND
VERTRAGSETHIK IM NEUEN AKTIENRECHT 15 (1934) (“Sie haben dabei richtig erkannt, daß es im
gewerblichen Leben entscheidend auf die führernde Einzelpersönlichkeit ankommt und daß man mit
der Zersplitterung der Leitung den Keim der Schwäche in ein Unternehmen hineinliegt.” Referring to
American business, “They have rightly recognised that in business life, that the personality of the
leader is decisive and that any division of the leadership carries the seed of corporate weakness.”);
Vagts, supra note 126, at 52–53.
327. HANSMANN, supra note 325, at 62–63, 97.
328. Id. at 97 says it is a social construct.
329. Cf. Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 678–81
(2006); Tom Schuller & Jeff Hyman, Trust Law and Trustees: Employee Representation in Pension
Schemes, 12 INDUS. L.J. 84, 91–93 (1983) (on codetermined pension boards); 403 Parl Deb HL (6th
ser.) (1979) cols. 1158-66 (U.K.) (the U.K. Post Office).
330. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Leo Strine,
Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and
Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007).
331. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 122.
332. This situation obviously changes in a company like Enron.
333. HANSMANN, supra note 325, at 111, like Jensen & Meckling, supra note 244, also claims
that “codetermination has been imposed upon German firms by force of law; no similar system seems
to have been adopted by any significant number of firms either inside or outside of Germany in the
absence of compulsion.” This is mistaken because German codetermination came from collective
agreements, which were later codified in law. See McGaughey, supra note 16.

748

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:697

is doubtful, precisely because the true investors of capital are usually
workers saving for retirement, and people want voice at work as well as in
their savings. In 2018, in a survey of 3,330 likely voters, 53% supported
having the right to vote for representatives on the boards of large
companies, while just 22% were opposed, and 25% did not know.334 In
addition, survey data in 1995 suggested thirty to 40 million American
workers wanted union representation, and 80 million wanted independent
collective voice in their workplace.335 The trend, despite the declining
density of membership, has been towards more support for unions.336 In
2017, a survey of 3,915 people found 48% of interviewees would join a
union if they could.337 This strongly suggests that the extreme position of
shareholders monopolizing the votes in corporate governance, let alone
asset managers, is deeply illegitimate in the United States today.
III. RECREATING THE LABORATORIES OF ENTERPRISE
Articulated support for labor’s voice in corporate governance has
grown so much338 that it is necessary to ask, are there any barriers to law
reform? At first glance the barriers may seem tremendous, because it is
commonplace that labor law has “ossified” at a federal level,339 for at least
four reasons. First, money buys almost all sides of the political
spectrum,340 and the rich and corporate boards oppose labor rights.
Second, federal legislation must pass the House, Senate, and President
that, due to different election times, are often politically divided. Third,
the Senate filibuster and cloture rules mean sixty of one hundred votes are
needed to make law. Since 1980, Democrats had a legislative majority in
just four years. Fourth, even if a law passes, the Supreme Court has
334. Dylan Matthews, Workers Don’t Have Much Say in Corporations. Why Not Give Them
Seats on the Board?, VOX (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17086720/poll-corporateboard-democracy-worker-council-codetermination-union-labor [perma.cc/WFC5-KE7L].
335. Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works
Councils Story, in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES 97, 97–98 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1995).
336. Alex Bryson & Richard B. Freeman, Workers Needs and Voice in the US and UK (Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12310, 2006) (citing a 2005 Zogby poll that reported 35%
would vote for union, while a 2004 Zogby poll found 45% would support a union).
337. Thomas A. Kochan et al., Voice Gaps at Work, Options for Closing Them, and Challenges
for Future Actions and Research (Int’l Labour Review, Working Paper, 2018).
338. E.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (2015)
(referring to codetermination as “highly successful”); Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the
Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607 (2004); Charles B.
Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining Union Environment to Provide
Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1997); Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive
Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765 (2011).
339. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527
(2002).
340. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); McGaughey, supra note 21.
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assumed an ostensible right (based on theories of “unconstitutionality”
that its members invent)341 to strike down legislation. Judges tend not to
be from working-class backgrounds and have used their self-endowed
power to suppress labor voice.
All this said, the same conditions do not prevail among the states,
where the political balance is very different than in Washington D.C.
Before the federal government recovers its capacity to act, could the states
recreate themselves as laboratories of enterprise? In 1982, Clyde Summers
argued that the federal government would have to legislate for
codetermination because, otherwise, corporations would move to avoid
state law, and any such laws could conflict with federal labor and antitrust
law.342 Of course, states could be interested not only (1) in workers on
boards, but also (2) in advancing labor’s voice in capital, and (3) in work
councils. So, do legal barriers exist for democracy in America at work?
First, states can in fact enact codetermination laws without any real
barrier. There is no reason in constitutional or federal law to prevent it,
and this is especially true since Massachusetts has had a codetermination
law, however voluntary, since 1919. The dominant view is that the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(2) also presents no barrier to
corporate board participation.343 Worker representation on corporate
boards is one of the most important achievements of collective bargaining,
which the NLRA promotes. But would corporations move to other states
to avoid a codetermination law? The empirical evidence from the
European Union, which has similar incorporation freedom, suggests such
predictions are exaggerated,344 and codetermination has steadily spread.
Firms have very good reasons to maintain the trust, confidence and
participation of their workforces because it is clear that worker
participation raises productivity, and therefore the potential for profit for
341. Recent examples include District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), striking down
a 30-year ban on handguns in Washington D.C., and Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee,
558 U.S. 310 (2010), striking down limits on corporations spending money to influence elections. The
source of the U.S. Supreme Court’s authority to strike down legislation is the U.S. Supreme Court
case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), implying the Court’s power into Article 3,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, to strike down laws by adopting, in substance, the reasoning of Dr.
Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646; 8 Co. Rep. 113b.
342. Clyde Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and
Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. SEC. REG. 155, 157 (1982).
343. E.g., J. Bautz Bonanno, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice
in Europe and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 947 (1976); Brian Hamer, Serving
Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 639
(1981); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 73, 126–38 (1988); Erik B. Wulff, The West German
Model of Codetermination Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 51 IND. L.J. 795 (1976).
344. Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?, 12
EUROPEAN L.J. 440 (2006).
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everyone. Capital moves faster than labor, but ideas move faster still. Ideas
also stick. The states that make up nearly two-thirds of all incorporations
are Delaware, California, and New York.345 These states lean towards
Democratic majorities. If they or others chose, they could require that a
percentage of board seats are reserved for employees, adapting the models
in the Reward Work Act or the Accountable Capitalism Act. Alternatively,
state laws could require that employees as well as shareholders have a
percentage of votes at each annual general meeting, or they could do
both.346
Second, could states ensure that the votes bought by labor’s capital
are cast only in accordance with the preferences of elected representatives
of workers and beneficiaries? While the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 has broad preemption provisions,347 its absence of
governance rules means it cannot preempt state law that requires
governance rights for labor: this logically remains the domain of state trust
or corporate law. Many trusts and mutual fund corporations are established
in Massachusetts and Delaware.348 If states chose, first, they could follow
the model of the Workplace Democracy Acts or the Employees’ Pension
Security Acts to require one-half representation of beneficiaries in any
single-employer or other form of pension plan. A federal model to do so
is readily available in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 § 302(c)(5)(B).349 In
addition, states could require that corporate governance departments of
345. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1809–10 (2002) (Showing Delaware 57.75%, California
4.33%, New York 3.46%, Nevada 3.32%, Minnesota 2.73%, Florida 2.53%, Texas 2.25%, Colorado
2.02%, Pennsylvania 1.9%, Maryland 1.81%, and Ohio 1.72%. By contrast, the real seats of
corporations are California 19.2%, Texas 8.97%, New York 8.82%, Maryland 5.51%, Florida 5.02%,
New Jersey 4.76%, Pennsylvania 3.8%, Illinois 3.69%, Minnesota 3.25%, and Colorado 3.08%.).
346. State corporation law typically suggests that shareholders exercise appointment or removal
rights over the board. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2016) (removal “by the holders of a
majority of the shares”); CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (2016) (directors elected “at each annual meeting of
shareholders.”); CAL. CORP. CODE § 303 (directors may be removed “if the removal is approved by
the outstanding shares” subject to various rules); CAL. CORP. CODE § 304 (10% of shareholders can
apply for removal by court for fraud or gross abuse); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 703 (2016) (“At each
annual meeting of shareholders, directors shall be elected.”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 706 (removal
“for cause by a vote of shareholders”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (The
Model Act is mirrored in many states. It suggests in § 8.03(c), “Directors are elected at the first annual
shareholders’ meeting,” in § 8.08(a), “[S]hareholders may remove one or more directors with or
without cause,” and in § 8.08 (b), “If a director is elected by a voting group of shareholders, only the
shareholders of that voting group may participate in the vote to remove that director.”). These Acts
can be amended to say “shareholders or employees” have these powers, with the percentage of votes
in annual meetings, or board seats, to be allocated to employees by a company’s bylaws.
347. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974) (noting that ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”).
348. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 222 (2018).
349. Cf. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (holding that a New York law was
preempted only insofar as it prohibited practices that were lawful under federal law).
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mutual funds are wholly elected by the holders of 401(k) accounts. Most
importantly, states have the right to enforce fiduciary laws to stop any
possibility of a conflict of interest between a mutual firm’s voting and its
sale of pension products to companies.350 States could require that no asset
manager casts votes on other people’s money without express instructions
or without following the wishes of elected representatives of beneficiaries.
A model that can be adapted is the Dodd-Frank Act § 957, which restricts
brokers voting without instructions.
Third, could states require that employees within their territory have
a right to elect work councils with binding rights, for instance, in working
time, social funds, or dismissals?351 Fundamentally, there appears to be no
reason why a truly independent work council, which is not dominated or
funded by the employer, cannot be established by collective agreement or
law.352 The NLRA of 1935 § 8(a)(2) prohibits a body where there is
“actual domination” by an employer, so bona fide cooperative efforts are
not hindered,353 nor are genuine initiatives for “a meaningful avenue for
the expression of employee wishes.”354 If there is not merely an expression
of wishes, but binding rights resulting from elected work council
decisions, it is inconceivable that this touches the mischief that Senator
Wagner and Congress intended to resolve. The episode at the Volkswagen
plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee from 2014 to 2016 underlines the point.
The only credible argument that a work council would be preempted was
if the policy ensured that management could veto whatever the “work
council” decided.355 Management vetoes would make the work council a
sham under a genuine work council law. If states simply adopted the model
that the U.S. government helped write for Germany in 1946,356 they would
meaningfully advance voice at work.

350. See Halebian v. Berv, 931 N.E.2d 986 (Mass. 2010); Saminsky v. Abbott, 185 A.2d 766
(Del. Ch. 1961).
351. For an indicative list, see the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) [German Works
Constitution Act], Jan. 15, 1972, BGBL. I at 2518, §§ 87, 111 (Ger.) (as amended) (listing thirteen
issues plus arrangements for dismissal decisions to go to arbitration or a court if the employee-elected
work council objects).
352. The funding of work councils appears to be the only difference between the system that
emerged in Germany following Control Council Law No. 22, as the employer must provide financing
for work council activities: this is not viewed as compromising the work council’s independence.
353. Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
354. Hertzka and Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1974).
355. Cf. Benjamin Sachs, A New Way Forward for VW-Tennessee, ONLABOR, May 20, 2014,
https://onlabor.org/a-new-way-forward-for-vw-tennessee/ [perma.cc/3QWH-LEHD].
356. Control Council Law No. 22 Works Councils, Apr. 10, 1946, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 1945–1946, at 133–36 (1946), LSE Archives 43 (R498).
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CONCLUSION
Can there be democracy in America at work? The answer must be
yes. The United States has the world’s oldest codetermination law
continually in force. Workers have been on the boards of manufacturing,
retail, automobile, aeroplane, steel, and food companies. Had labor not
been continually suppressed by hostile courts and governments, unions
would have pressed for workers on boards in telecommunications,
supermarkets, beverage production and more. The use of labor’s capital
by union and public pension funds for positive social policies counts
among the most sophisticated and organized in the world.357 In the broad
sweep of history, over half of the Amendments to the Constitution, nine
out of seventeen since the Declaration of Independence, have directly
concerned the right to vote.358 The right to vote, not just in politics but also
at work, in retirement, and in the economy holds no less constitutional
significance. In this like so much else, America is still a land of
opportunity.
As the empirical case grows, and as labor law becomes central to
twenty-first century corporate governance,359 it is likely that the opposition
to labor’s voice in the economy will become increasingly based on
emotional appeal. This Article has made the case that the claims of labor
voice being foreign, inefficient, unpopular, or unlawful are evidence-free.
But if history or reality will not comply, an opponent’s best alternative is
to build contempt for reason.360 This is the tragic state of political debate
today. At its core, a more democratic economy is essential to preserve
democracy in politics. Escalating economic inequality means a house
more divided, and the laws which underpin corporate governance are
probably the most important pre-tax causes of escalating inequality
today.361 Democracy ensures that governance is in the hands of the many,
not the few, and that informed, democratic deliberation, with reasoned
357. See generally WEBBER, supra note 17.
358. Those Amendments include the Twelfth (presidential election procedure), Thirteenth
(abolishing slavery), Fourteenth (defining citizenship), Fifteenth (vote regardless of race), Seventeenth
(direct Senator elections), Nineteenth (vote regardless of gender), Twenty-Third (enfranchising D.C.
voters), Twenty-Fourth (prohibiting poll taxes), and Twenty-Sixth (enfranchising people over eighteen
years old).
359. Cf. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 32 (1986) (“[E]ven if your aim is not to
understand all of law’s effects on corporate activities but only to grasp the basic legal ‘constitution’ or
make-up of the modern corporation, you must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of
labor law.”).
360. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA 244–49
(2018) (on web: “robots who told [American voters] what they wanted to hear”).
361. Cf. Elizabeth Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-toshareholders-1534287687 (noting “the wealthiest 10% of U.S. households own 84% of Americanheld shares”).
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social debate, provides the basis for freedom, personal autonomy, and
liberty because this is what the overwhelming majority of people want for
themselves. “We may have democracy,” Louis Brandeis once said, “or we
may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have
both.”362 The truth is, the corporation has already socialized property,363
ensuring that individuals can freely invest their savings, and invest their
labor, as one. Through the strength of their common endeavor, people can
achieve social and economic progress, and better together than they would
alone. But if property is social, it is sorely unequal because it is not yet
democratic. The problem is no longer merely the socialization of
ownership, but the democratization of power. Democracy in America
needs to work.

362. RAYMOND LONERGAN, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, GREAT AMERICAN 42 (1941).
363. ADOLF A. BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER IN A FREE SOCIETY (1957).

